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Abstract 
 
Many theorists have posited that democratic transitions in states divided along 
ethnic, racial, or religious lines are accompanied by violent conflict and thus unlikely to 
succeed. The end of authoritarian rule in Iraq and the introduction of democracy by the 
United States has been followed by many such challenges, and it has been argued that the 
artificial Iraqi state and its Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia communities does not possess the 
unity as required by democratic government. However, an informed analysis of Iraqi 
democracy requires attention to the role of its authoritarian leaders and war and economic 
hardships in making Iraq’s ethnosectarian communities largely competitive and 
conflictual. Furthermore, it is possible that continued participation in democratic 
institutions and processes, though imperfect, may build support for the system and 
legitimize it as the means to make political decisions. As a consequence, Iraqis may 
increasingly identify with the state and its democratic system rather than their more rigid, 
and at times conflicting, ethnosectarian identities.   
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYSIS 
The issue of identity and its effect on statehood and governance is important, 
especially in those countries whose populations are divided along ethnic, religious, or 
tribal lines. This matter is particularly relevant in the Middle East, given that many of its 
states were formed relatively arbitrarily by European leaders after World War I, with 
little regard to how communities were divided or combined within new territorial 
boundaries. The fledgling democracy in Iraq is currently facing challenges related to this 
issue as its leaders attempt to fashion a more equitable and functioning government out of 
distinct and sometimes conflicting groups. It is the hope of these leaders and of American 
policymakers that democracy will offer representation to all Iraqis while also promoting 
loyalty to the state rather than to more divisive subidentities. 
I will argue that although American policymakers overestimated Iraqi national 
unity in their initial attempts to introduce democracy, the democratization process may 
itself offer the means by which a unified state is formed. In doing so, I look at the nature 
of coalition building and cooperation among Iraqi political groupings and the pressing 
economic and security issues that have forced such compromise. Furthermore, I will 
contend that the successful “doing” of democracy may lead the Iraqi people to place trust 
in the democratic system and see it as offering the political means to conflict resolution 
and economic and social progress. Though Iraqis may be critical of the government in 
terms of efficiency and responsiveness, it is possible to argue that most have come to 
2 
understand that their political and economic futures, both as individuals and 
communities, are tied to participation in the democratic process. 
In “Beyond Identity,” Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper assert:  
…identity denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among members of 
a group or a category. This may be understood objectively (as a sameness ‘in 
itself’) or subjectively (as an experienced, felt, or perceived sameness).1  
 
Their statement captures the fluid nature of identity, as it can change over time depending 
upon individuals’ perceptions under various circumstances that call forth their 
identification with one group or another. Brubaker and Cooper see identity as the basis on 
which collective action can take place, and a product of that very action.2 Individuals who 
view themselves as part of an ethnic community or as citizens of the larger state will thus 
act with other members of the particular group while simultaneously strengthening the 
concept of the very group within which they are acting.  
A number of influential political theorists have set forth ideas as to how identity, 
whether based on the state or otherwise, affects state building and the formation of 
democratic government. As Robert A. Dahl notes:  
…the democratic process presupposes a unity. The criteria of the democratic 
process presuppose the rightfulness of the unit itself. If the unit itself is not 
considered proper or rightful – if its scope or domain is not justifiable – then it 
cannot be made rightful simply by democratic procedures.3  
 
In his famous work, “Transitions to Democracy,” Dankwart A. Rustow asserts that rather 
than economic or cultural explanations, what matters most for the process of 
democratization is the single background condition of national unity. In explaining this 
unity, he writes, “It simply means that the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be 
                                                 
1
 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’”, Theory and Society 29 (2000): 7.  
2
 Brubaker and Cooper, 7.  
3
 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 207.  
3 
must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong 
to.”4 It seems both authors contend that a successful democratic government requires, at 
the least, a defined territorial state that is agreed upon by all of its members as fitting and 
legitimate. This is a salient issue for Iraq, and not only for the Kurds, as many Sunnis and 
Shia also seem to question whether they owe their allegiance to the larger Iraqi nation or 
to their smaller respective communities. 
Iraq is a particularly interesting case given its history as a tenuous political entity 
created out of distinct and at times conflicting former provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
After its independence from Great Britain in 1932, successive leaders worked to foster a 
common nationalism among Iraq’s citizens. As early as 1933, however, King Faisal 
lamented: 
…there is still…no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, 
devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, 
connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually 
ready to rise against any government whatsoever.5  
 
This situation seemed to have changed little after six decades of national independence, 
for in 1982 a member of the Baathist inner cadre echoed King Faisal’s sentiments, 
writing as reported by Adeed Dawisha that “secessionism, sectarianism and 
tribalism…are tearing the unity of [Iraqi] society to pieces.”6    
Perhaps most notable in Iraq’s modern, pre-democratic history was Saddam 
Hussein’s manipulation of identity for personal and political gain. Saddam’s Baathist 
Party initially offered hope to Iraqis as it promised “a progressive, nationalist, and anti-
                                                 
4
 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2.3 
(1970): 350.  
5
 Adeed Dawisha, “Identity and Political Survival in Saddam’s Iraq,” Middle East Journal 53 (1999): 554.  
6
 Dawisha, 554.  
4 
imperialist future,”7 as well as equality between the various religious communities. 
However, Saddam used Baathism to create a nationalism that was, above all, loyal to 
himself. He then went on to emphasize different aspects of Iraqi identity at different 
points in time depending on which was most politically expedient. For example, he 
stressed Arab identity during the Iran-Iraq war, Islamic identity during the first Gulf War 
in response to Western intervention, and tribal identity during the economic and social 
upheavals following the implementation of sanctions by the United States.8                                                                                                                             
One might argue that the national unity and state identification as suggested by 
Dahl and Rustow to be necessary for democratic government did not exist at the time of 
the U.S. invasion. W. Andrew Terrill echoed this claim when he wrote in 2009 of the 
political situation following Saddam’s fall: 
The preferred option of most Iraqis is not yet fully clear. Moreover, the type of 
regime change that they support will have a great deal to do with how they define 
their own identities in a postwar environment. In the aftermath of Saddam’s 
ouster, Iraqis must determine how to order and emphasize their national and 
subnational identities…They must further decide if their ethnic and religious 
identities are complementary or antithetical to their identities as Iraqis.9 
 
Eric Davis, author of Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in 
Modern Iraq, similarly contends that at the time of the American-led effort to remove 
Saddam, the nature of the Iraqi political system remained an unresolved question and thus 
was likely to cause conflict.10 In this view, it is no surprise that the removal of Saddam 
                                                 
7
 W. Andrew Terrill, Nationalism, Sectarianism, and the Future of the U.S. Presence in  Post-Saddam Iraq 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 6.  
8
 Dawisha, 556. 
9
 Terrill, 1.  
10
 Eric Davis, Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 13.  
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and the attempts by the U.S. to create a functioning democratic government have been 
marked by violence and discord. 
It is also not clear the American policymakers responsible for formulating the 
next steps after the invasion fully understood Iraq’s ethnic and religious divisions. After 
years of Saddam’s policy of exacerbating tensions among communities to obtain support 
from alternating segments of Iraqi society and to better control the country’s diverse 
groups, it might have been expected that Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds would be distrustful 
of each other and their roles in the new power structures. Additionally, the failure of the 
United States to provide sufficient security immediately following the invasion 
contributed to Iraqi skepticism toward the central government and its American partners. 
Many Iraqis looked to their ethnic and religious communities for protection and 
continued to associate most strongly with these groups during the state’s early democratic 
practices.  
Iraqi identity has been characterized by competing and often conflicting ethnic 
and religious divisions. This is both a result of elite manipulation, especially under 
Saddam as he viewed such management necessary for retaining authoritarian control, and 
a symptom of the miscalculations of American policymakers in their attempts to 
implement democracy in a country whose context of nationality they seemed to little 
understand. As Davis argues:  
…the inability of Iraqis to construct a viable model of political community 
explains to a large degree the country’s political and social instability. The 
absence of a commonly accepted model of political community is related to the 
problem of collective identity and foundational myths.11  
 
                                                 
11
 Davis, 2.  
6 
It is possible, however, that Iraq’s democratic government, by providing equal 
representation and procedural fairness to individuals from all groups, might form an Iraqi 
nation even though the Iraqi state has long existed. Through institutions and policies that 
promote inclusion and offer opportunities for cooperation across ethnosectarian lines, 
democracy can provide Iraqis the means for consolidating the government and the state.  
Given the implications of a stable and democratic state for the region as a whole 
and for American interests there, I seek to better understand a number of topics, 
including: the seeming link between democratization and conflict in states divided along 
identity lines; the evolution of Iraqi national identity and the role of its leaders in the 
process; decisions made by the U.S. in its invasion and occupation that complicated the 
democratic transition; and most importantly, the prospects for democratic consolidation 
and with it, the formation of a civic, Iraqi identity. This final issue is significant as Iraq’s 
domestic situation has the potential to affect the stability of the larger Middle East, 
particularly in the absence of American troops following their withdrawal in December 
2011.  
In the second chapter, I explore research done on the relationship between the 
transition to democracy and conflict in states with various ethnic, religious, or other 
identity groups. I begin by noting various approaches to the concept of identity in order to 
grasp what it means and how it relates to citizens in representative democracies. Most 
significantly, I summarize a range of explanations as to why democratization is often 
accompanied by violence and how this affects the behavior of political actors, the 
electoral process, and democratic practices more generally. I pay special attention to the 
role of political elites, and argue the likelihood of conflict can be partly mitigated through 
7 
their attention to the participation and inclusion of all parties. Iraq’s experience with 
sectarian conflict and domestic instability is perhaps unsurprising when viewed in the 
context of the broader challenges faced by divided states during democratization. 
In chapter three, I give a brief modern history of Iraq with a focus on the fluid 
nature of Iraqi identity. Iraqis’ ambiguity toward the state as an object of their loyalty is 
partly a symptom of the state’s relatively short existence and disagreement over its 
rightful nature; however, I argue it is better explained by the policies of political elites 
and legacies of war and crises. Iraq’s communities have displayed cooperation at various 
points in the state’s history, but national leaders generally failed to implement the policies 
and processes necessary for involving citizens from all ethnic and sectarian groups. Iraq’s 
experience with war and economic hardship since the 1980s worsened most citizens’ 
identification with the state, as competition for political and economic goods took place 
largely on the basis of tribal and religious affiliations. 
Chapter four focuses on the mistakes committed by the United States pre- and 
post- 2003 invasion and how those errors made it more difficult for Iraqis’ to reconcile 
their religious and ethnic identities with the civic identity required for a newly democratic 
polity. Such errors include the de-Baathification project and its marginalization of the 
Sunni population, the disbanding of the Iraqi army, and miscalculations in the 
implementation of democratic institutions and processes. The resulting inter- and 
intrasectarian violence complicated an already challenging situation and further 
weakened the state in its ability to satisfy new demands for political participation. 
Though multiple elections have been held and a constitution was created, the political and 
security consequences of these mistakes continue to test Iraqi democracy.   
8 
I tackle the outstanding issue of the Kurds in chapter five, as their unique and 
contentious history poses another problem to the consolidation of democracy in Iraq. 
Though at times it seemed their place in the central government was improving, in 
general Kurdish relations with Baghdad were hostile. The invasion of Iraq by the U.S. 
was met with cooperation by the Kurds, and their willingness to participate in the new 
democratic system enabled them to play an important role in the early formation of the 
constitution and government. As demands by the Shia and Sunni have strengthened, 
however, the Kurds must negotiate between a desire to remain autonomous and the 
possibility of further involvement and identification with the central state. Successful 
integration of the Kurds will both strengthen the democratic system and reduce the 
likelihood of future conflict.  
In chapter six, I summarize recent events in Iraq with a concentration on evidence 
of intersectarian cooperation and support of democracy. I put these events in the context 
of important work done by various theorists on democratization whose arguments 
strengthen the view that Iraqi democracy can in fact gain legitimacy and stability. This 
analysis allows me to contend that democratization can succeed even in an arguably 
fragmented state such as Iraq. Though Iraq may not meet what many theorists’ argue to 
be the prerequisites for democratic government, I assert that trust in the democratic 
government and its mechanisms for reducing conflict, guaranteeing rights, and allocating 
goods and services may lead to a stable and functioning representative government. I 
believe it can be shown that the actual “doing” of democracy, of forming governments 
and of making policy decisions, may help to engender an Iraqi identity distinct from and 
encompassing other ethnic and religious subdivisions.  
9 
Finally, I conclude with a summary of my findings and suggestions for the future 
of Iraqi democracy. While I readily acknowledge the threats to democracy posed by 
pressing social and economic concerns and the actions of self-serving elites, I hope to 
show that a lasting democratic Iraq is feasible. Iraq’s democratic system, though 
imperfect, will strengthen and be sustained through continued participation in its 
elections and adherence to the guarantees and constraints provided by its institutions. 
This argument is consistent with Brubaker and Cooper’s belief in the action oriented 
nature of identity; that by acting as though part of the Iraqi state and responsible for its 
continuation and success, Iraqis will come to see themselves as citizens first and 
foremost.  
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CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICT DURING DEMOCRATIZATION – A GENERAL 
SUMMARY 
 There has been extensive research done on the link between democratic 
transitions and identity-based conflict. It is largely accepted that states divided along 
religious, ethnic, racial, or other lines are likely to experience violence during the 
democratization process. However, this observation presents a paradox: though the 
democratic transition will probably lead to conflict, effective democratic government 
offers the best means of ameliorating such conflict by creating civic, less rigid identities 
and channeling differences through institutions that provide equal representation and 
procedural fairness. While established democratic systems are arguably better at dealing 
with disputes among communities and individuals, the lack of functioning institutions 
and an inconsistent adherence to the rule of law characteristic of transitional democracies 
often triggers identity conflict and threatens democratic consolidation.   
 Analysts of democratization have frequently posited that diverse societies face 
special challenges in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. As M. Steven 
Fish and Robin S. Brooks write, “…ethnic differences divide society and make 
compromise and consensus difficult. Heterogeneity poses the risk of intercommunal 
violence, which can undermine open politics.”12 In this view, the values of cooperation 
                                                 
12
 M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks, “Does Diversity Hurt Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 15.1 
(2004): 154. 
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and negotiation so important in democracy are challenged by citizens who perceive 
loyalty to the clan or ethnic group as prior to loyalty to the shared territorial state. 
Democracy involves the freedom of individuals to associate with and lobby on behalf of 
those with whom they share interests. If these associations correspond almost exclusively 
to one’s ethnicity, race, or religion, political outcomes that favor other groups will be 
seen as threats to the very existence of such identities. 
Some of the worst incidents of conflict between ethnic and religious groups 
during the transition to democracy have occurred in Bosnia, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, 
and Sri Lanka. Conflict seemingly associated with the new democratic government has 
also occurred among Iraq’s communities, leading many observers to question whether 
democracy is viable in a state with such ethnic and sectarian divisions. As intersectarian 
violence remains a challenge to Iraq’s democracy, it is instructive to review major 
theorists’ arguments regarding the democracy-conflict nexus, including the role of 
identity, elites, and institutions. A complete analysis of Iraq reveals that though its early 
record confirms many of these theorists’ predictions, continued experience with the 
democratic system may provide long-term stability.  
 Because of the likelihood that conflict will occur during democratization, many 
theorists have argued that well-functioning democratic states require unified nations. 
Such states will not face significant threats to their authority and legitimacy by groups 
that enjoy competing loyalty. As Clarisa Rile Hayward writes:  
Democracy needs some form of citizen-identity for purposes of integration…If 
‘rule by the people’ is to mean more than simply rule by the majority in the 
interest of the majority…then every democratic polity needs some civic bond, 
 12 
some cohesive force that can prompt its citizens to act politically in ways that take 
into account the claims and the perspectives of others.13  
 
Successful democracy in divided states arguably entails citizens that cooperate and 
recognize common interests across divisions for the good of the shared polity. Such 
empathy also reduces perceptions of grievance among minorities or other communities 
whose members are limited in the representative power. 
 In other words, democracies need inclusive identities that all or nearly all citizens 
agree upon. These identities form the foundation of citizens’ equal belonging in the state. 
The idea of identity, however, is vague from both a conceptual and functional standpoint. 
The Encyclopedia of Political Science notes that “[g]enerally, the sense of self is 
validated by membership in a group or affiliation with something intangible such as a 
culture or religion,”14 prompting individuals to identify with such groups. Given 
individuals’ proclivity to join others on the basis of intangible qualities, “[o]ne of the 
most prominent issues of the postmaterialist world is identity.”15 In the modern nation-
state system, individuals sometimes identify with substate groups that challenge either the 
state’s political authority or territorial legitimacy. Consequently:  
Parties that bitterly oppose one another within a given state might each be 
recognized as embodying a ‘politics of identity’ focused on defending the 
interests and values of their particular nationality rather than on the state as a 
whole.16  
 
                                                 
13
 Clarisa Rile Hayward, “Democracy’s Identity Problem: Is ‘Constitutional Patriotism’ the Answer?,” 
Constellations 14.2 (2007): 182. 
14
 George Thomas Kurian, ed., The Encyclopedia of Political Science Vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2010), 756. 
15
 Kurian, The Encyclopedia, 1084. 
16
 Kurian, The Encyclopedia, 1084. 
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 There is also debate concerning the nature of identity and how it is acquired and 
maintained. Primordialists view identity as unchanging, essential, and deeply rooted 
regardless of context. Accordingly, conflict between or among identity groups is 
inevitable and intractable. Constructivists, on the other hand, focus on political and 
socioeconomic factors that stimulate conflict on the basis of identities that in other 
circumstances may exist alongside each other peacefully. This perspective “is more 
dynamic than the former [primordialism] because it stresses change, contextuality, and 
competition among ethnic [or other identity] groups for resources.”17 Only when identity 
becomes implicated in the struggle for political and economic goods is conflict likely and 
problematic for diverse states and societies.  
 Identity in the Middle East is of particular interest because the division of colonial 
empires was largely unsuccessful in ingraining a sense of loyalty to the modern states and 
their nascent structures. In many cases, the new state boundaries did not correspond to 
existing ethnic and tribal divisions. Furthermore, state institutions tended to favor groups 
on the basis of their identities rather than considerations of ability and merit. P.R. 
Kumaraswamy writes:  
More than three-quarters of a century after the disintegration of the Ottoman 
Empire, from whom most of them emerged, these states have been unable to 
define, project, and maintain a national identity that is both inclusive and 
representative.18  
                                                 
17
 Demet Yalcin Mousseau, “Democratizing with Ethnic Divisions: A Source of Conflict?”, Journal of 
Peace Research 38.5 (2001): 549. 
18
 P.R. Kumaraswamy, “Who Am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 10.1 (2006): 63. 
 14 
Though the existence of Middle Eastern states is today largely unchallenged, nationalism 
centered on the country and its governmental institutions is combined with or in some 
instances threatened by loyalty to religion, ethnicity, tribe, or clan. 
 These states’ failure to resolve this tension is in many ways related to their 
inability or perhaps unwillingness to include all citizens in the state’s political and 
economic development equally, regardless of ethnicity or religion. Kumaraswamy 
continues:  
Without exception, all of the Middle Eastern states have tried to impose an 
identity from above. Whether ideological, religious, dynastical, or powercentric, 
these attempts have invariably failed and have often resulted in schism and 
sectarian tensions.19 
 
 Debate in the Middle East over the nature of the state and its foundations is particularly 
salient as demands for just and representative government have increased.  In some cases, 
identities were manipulated or played off each other by authoritarian regimes to maintain 
power, worsening tensions. Even in those states that have succeeded in overthrowing 
autocratic leaders, there remains disagreement among citizens over the proper 
understanding of the state and the identity of its people.  
 Dankwart A. Rustow also draws attention to considerations of identity in the 
transition to representative government. He posits that rather than certain economic or 
cultural provisions, democratization requires “a single background condition – national 
unity.”20 A political system such as democracy, in which power naturally shifts and 
uncertainties are common, needs individuals that are not frightened by the prospect of 
                                                 
19
 Kumaraswamy, “Who Am I?”, 63. 
20
 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2.3 
(1970): 350. 
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their community or identity group temporarily losing power. Additionally, according to 
Alfred C. Stepan, “…citizens within a democratic federation should have dual but 
complementary political identities.”21 While individuals may rightfully remain part of 
their ethnic or religious communities, they must also agree to participate in the shared 
civic sphere on an equal basis with those from other groups. 
 Juan J. Linz and Stepan refer to this issue as a “stateness” problem, one in which 
“a significant proportion of the population does not accept the boundaries of the 
territorial state (whether constituted democratically or not) as a legitimate political unit to 
which they owe obedience.”22 Earlier analyses of democratic transitions had paid little 
attention to the potential incongruence between territorial boundaries and national 
identities. In most of those cases, particularly in Southern Europe and Latin America, 
ethnic and religious nationalist threats to the state were not a factor. The spread of 
democracy to Eastern Europe, for example, where states contained multiple nationalisms 
competing for political and economic power, brought this issue to the attention of 
theorists and policymakers. The spread of democracy was still viewed positively, but 
analysts wondered if the new considerations posed by these states would inhibit the 
seeming worldwide trend to representative government.  
 Citizens who are not convinced of their belonging in the polity will likely adhere 
to the groups to which they feel more loyal during times of uncertainty, including the 
democratic transition. As Mark R. Beissinger argues, some may react violently as they 
compete for power due to “…the larger system of ethnic social relationships that 
                                                 
21
 Alfred C. Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 192. 
22
 Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, “Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, 
and Yugoslavia,” Daedelus 121.2 (1992), 123. 
 16 
democratization potentially reconfigures and the ways in which democratization engages 
the interests and passions of large numbers of people.”23 Different groups are brought 
into contact in the context of competition for political power, including the ability to 
make decisions on state goods and resources. Because communities see their futures as 
closely tied to such issues, determining who makes these decisions becomes a major 
source of contention. 
 In Seymour Martin Lipset’s famous work, “Some Social Requisites of 
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” he posits a number of 
conditions necessary for democratic government. One of them is legitimacy, or wide 
support for the political system by the citizens of the state. Challenges to such legitimacy 
arise during the transition to democracy:  
…if (a) all major groups do not secure access to the political system early in the 
transitional period, or at least as soon as they develop political demands; or, if (b) 
the status of major conservative institutions is threatened during the period of 
structural change.24 
 
Both of these outcomes are likely during democratization in divided states. Democracy 
inevitably leads to new power configurations and involves individuals of different races, 
ethnicities, and religions in the struggle for political power. Perceptions of grievance 
among one or more such groups will lead them to disapprove of the system and seek its 
end. Furthermore, the potential loss of power for an identity group that was generally 
favored under authoritarian rule may become another source of tension.   
                                                 
23
 Mark R. Beissinger, “A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy 19.3 
(2008): 90. 
24
 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review 53.1 (1959): 87. 
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The probability of conflict during democratization has been confirmed by 
numerous studies. Stephen M. Saideman and others engage in such an analysis, writing:  
…we assume that groups are more likely to act up when they are uncertain about 
their position and prospects for the future. Thus we expect more ethnic conflict 
during periods of institutional upheaval in which new regimes are installed and 
elections are held for the first time.25 
  
Their study goes on to empirically verify this prediction. The level and nature of conflict 
naturally differs among democratizing countries, however. This variance depends on, 
among other factors, the way in which elites employ identity for their own purposes, the 
extent to which identity becomes a marker for access to the political system, and “the 
opportunities for and obstacles to the mobilization of ethnic differences.”26 While conflict 
is likely, its degree and character differs according to a state’s past experiences with 
identity relations and the decisions made by elites during this contentious period.  
Democracy faces further challenges in countries where war centered largely on 
ethnic or religious differences has already occurred. Anna K. Jarstad summarizes:  
Insecurity and unsolved grievances mean that political elites, as well as civil 
society, remain polarized and that the basis for inclusive ideologies is weak. In 
combination with a shattered infrastructure, and an economy structured on the 
spoils of war, this polarization implies that democratization faces particular 
challenges in post-war societies.27  
 
Competition for political power often reignites the same aspirations and grievances that 
were a subject of fighting during the war. Additionally, violence may reignite and 
                                                 
25
 Stephen M. Saideman et al., “Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled 
Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998,” Comparative Political Studies 35.1 (2002): 107. 
26
 Beissinger, “A New Look,” 90. 
27
 Anna K. Jarstad, “Dilemmas of War-to-Democracy Transitions: Theories and Concepts,” in From War to 
Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, ed. Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 19. 
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challenge both the political system and any sort of emerging peace settlement if 
democracy fails to fix the problems that led to or were aggravated by conflict. 
 Jack Snyder also compiles evidence of the democracy-conflict link in his book, 
From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. Drawing from 
instances of ethnic and identity conflict during the 1990s, he argues that most of the states 
implicated: 
…experienced a partial improvement in their political or civil liberties in the year 
or so before the strife broke out. Most of these conflicts occurred in states that 
were taking initial steps toward a democratic transition, such as holding contested 
elections and allowing a variety of political groups to criticize the government and 
each other.28 
  
In Yugoslavia, for example, relatively peaceful relations among ethnic groups were made 
more conflictual as a result of the democratization process. The democratic transition 
brought “rising expectations, a higher level of resources, the assertiveness of newly active 
forces, and the relaxation of traditional constraints,”29 all placing stress on intergroup 
relations.  
 Like Saideman et al., Snyder notes that the leadership and early institutions 
present during democratization play a crucial role and either help or hurt the formation of 
a civic, national identity. He writes: “How people are included in the political life of their 
state determines the kind of nationalist consciousness that they develop, as well as the 
degree of nationalist conflict that democratization brings.”30 This evidence is more in line 
with a constructivist view of identity, as conflict among ethnic and religious communities 
                                                 
28
 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2000), 28. 
29
 Samuel H. Barnes, “The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies,” The American 
Journal of International Law 95.1 (2001): 90. 
30
 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 36. 
 19 
becomes more problematic because of the opportunities and motivations presented in 
democratic government. If groups receive credible guarantees that their members will be 
included and their interests acknowledged in the new power configuration, they may 
become more supportive of the state generally and democratic processes in particular.   
 The likelihood of conflict is greatly affected by the presence of elites who take 
advantage of the transitional uncertainty to mobilize support and gain followers through 
appeals to identity. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that while political 
entrepreneurs might not subscribe to the views of extremists who completely oppose 
compromise across identity groups, they understand the usefulness of identity arguments 
to succeed politically. Accordingly, “Ethnicity often provides a key marker for self-
aggrandizing politicians seeking to build constituencies for attaining or maintaining 
political power.”31 A process of “ethnic outbidding” then ensues where more moderate 
politicians realize they must too seek support on the basis of ethnicity, race, or religion in 
order to compete with more immoderate candidates. Consequently, citizens’ choices of 
candidates are differentiated largely by their membership in a particular community, and 
they come to equate their political identities with their ethnic or religious identities.  
 Benjamin Reilly similarly argues that the mobilization of identity by elites and the 
formation of identity-based political parties are common during democratization in 
multiethnic states. In his view, the emotive nature of appeals to a community’s history 
and survival is especially contributory to the likelihood of conflict during this period.32 
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Burundi is one state where ethnic mobilization by elites in the context of competition for 
political power led to disastrous outcomes. While the 1993 elections were intended to 
create a power-sharing government, the formation and strengthening of parties 
characterized by ethnic identities and demands “served as a catalyst for the ethnic 
genocide that was to follow.”33 Not every case of violence is so extreme, but Burundi is 
evidence of the important role of elites in the process and their potential to either help or 
hurt democratization. 
 The potential for identity conflict is also a product of the effectiveness of the state 
in providing social and economic goods for all citizens, irrespective of ethnicity, race, or 
religion. The state itself can play an important role in creating a national identity that 
might not exist naturally within its territorial boundaries. As Sami Zubaida argues:  
…there is a ‘material’ basis to this formation of the nation-state in the economic-
fiscal function of the state, its allocation of resources and employment in its 
swelling ranks, supplemented by a national educational system that produces 
qualifications for employment, and cultural field of media operating in a 
standardized national language.34 
 
Many of these tasks are implicated in a state’s modernization in the fields of 
communications, education, and industry. If states are unable to successfully develop 
their economies and social structures, however, attempts to create a national identity will 
be ineffective and may even generate tensions due to a perception that some groups have 
benefited at the expense of others.  
 States such as these have largely failed to create the social capital, or social 
relations based on cooperation and trust, often considered necessary for democracy. 
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Snyder emphasizes the challenges to democratization in states with economic and social 
hardships:  
Traditional patronage networks often dominate the politics of such states. […] 
The capacity of these societies for mass-scale collective action is so low that 
patronage networks tend to focus on smaller-scale ties among personal cronies, 
strongmen, clans within the broader ethnic groups, or other localized networks.35  
 
Though democracy provides greater access to the political system, societies 
inexperienced in cooperation across identity groups in pursuit of broad, national goals 
may fail to take advantage of new opportunities for civic engagement and identification. 
Rather, citizens of these states will continue to look to their respective communities for 
security and support.  
 Identity conflict related to democratization in turn weakens the state and lessens 
its ability to manage threats to its authority and security. Lake and Rothchild believe 
much of this conflict is initiated by groups that are distrustful of the state’s capacity to 
mediate among competing demands and thus worry about their communities’ future 
economic and political wellbeing. Accordingly, “Collective fears of the future arise when 
states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of 
protection for groups.”36 Elites who appeal to ethnicity or religion become more 
attractive and seek to capitalize on the fears of their supporters, leading to further 
destabilization.  
 Lake and Rothchild go so far as to argue that state weakness is a necessary 
condition for the occurrence of violence among ethnic or other identity groups. They 
write:  
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As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve 
strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous 
violence. As information failures, problems of credible commitment, and the 
security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and 
conflict becomes more likely.37  
 
It is also possible that the process of democratization, by threatening established power 
relationships, will lead once dominant actors and their followers to seek to keep the state 
weak and easy manipulated. Successful democratic consolidation is then threatened as the 
state is unable to provide security and the new institutions remain ineffectual. Again, a 
constructivist view of identity is implicated as state weakness prior to or as a result of 
democracy is problematic in the incentives and opportunities it provides for identity 
conflict. 
 As will be explained more fully in following chapters, Iraq was in many respects 
a weak state at the time of the 2003 invasion and American-led transition to democracy. 
This weakness combined with divisions along identity lines ensured that democratization 
would face numerous challenges. Andreas Wimmer writes in 2004:  
…even if most Iraqis wanted democracy, it may not work because the political 
conflicts unleashed by democratization exceed the conflict absorption capacities. 
More specifically, democracy entails the danger that the demands of the Kurds, 
Shia, and Sunni leaders spiral up and unleash centripetal forces that cannot be 
held in check by a weak center.38  
 
While the extent of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions is debatable, increased demands 
for political and economic power in an already fragile state served to antagonize 
communities and complicate the process. Democracy became framed as a competition 
among the Kurds, Shia, and Sunni for control of the state.  
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 The Sunni reaction to democratization, for example, confirms the expectation that 
the uncertainty of a democratic transition increases the likelihood of conflict in divided 
states. This is especially the case when an ethnic or religious minority was favored by the 
authoritarian regime, as the Sunnis were by Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. In 
such a situation, Beissinger writes:  
…changing the regime necessarily means fundamentally changing the system of 
ethnic stratification. The main problem facing democratizers in such countries is 
how to demobilize previously favored minorities and gain their acquiescence to 
their altered, less favored role in a reconstructed social order.39  
 
The process of de-Baathification undertaken by the U.S., through which thousands of 
Sunnis belonging to Saddam’s Baath party were removed from their state positions, did 
little to reassure Iraq’s Sunnis that democratization would not involve anything more than 
their loss of power at the hands of the Shia and Kurds. 
 Lake and Rothchild similarly argue that it is often the perceptions of the minority 
concerning their place in the new system that determines the viability of democracy. 
Much of this is due to their fears of the future, as well as the inadequacy of the new 
democratic institutions to adequately express and protect their interests. According to 
Lake and Rothchild:  
…for the less powerful group to agree voluntarily to enter and abide by the 
contract, its interests must also be addressed, including its concern that the more 
powerful group will try to exploit it and alter the terms of the contract at some 
future date. Indeed, it is the minority, fearful of future exploitation and violence, 
that ultimately determines the viability of any existing ethnic contract.40  
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Though democracy in theory protects the individual rights of all citizens, its majoritarian 
outcomes may lead minority groups to be concerned for both their political and security 
prospects.  
 Elections are the major arena within which frustration and anxiety play out during 
democratization, and thus commonly provoke conflict. Groups that expect to lose power 
as a result of the election process attempt to discredit this crucial step in the democratic 
transition. According to Jarstad:  
By threats and intimidation, these actors may seek to disrupt the transition, 
overthrow the election results, or prevent election campaigns or voters from going 
to the polls. In the worst cases, elections trigger violent conflict and the process of 
democratization is halted or reversed.41  
 
Though it is hoped political parties or factions will form on the basis of issues other than 
identity, the highly competitive nature of the first contest for political power often leads 
elites and individuals to support those groups with whom they feel the most affinity. The 
lines drawn in the process of the first election may then come to characterize the creation 
of a government and future elections. 
 Voting along strictly identity lines was particularly obvious in Bosnia’s first 
democratic electoral contest. Deep enmity and distrust among ethnic groups there 
prevented the formation of multiethnic political parties and significant voting across 
ethnicities. The resulting divided government meant that any cooperation or deliberation 
among ethnic groups had to be done at the elite level, limiting citizen participation and 
broader societal change.42 Interactions among Bosnian ethnic groups were truly strained, 
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and democratization did not succeed in bringing groups together in an equal and 
representative political system. While it was hoped later elections would shift from 
essentially ethnic censuses, there has so far been little incentive for political actors to 
seek support from individuals outside their communities. The government remains 
divided, with political contests viewed in strictly ethnic terms.   
 In democratization more generally, elections are viewed as an important event in 
the progression towards representative government. As a result:  
Where favorable circumstances prevail (i.e., an agreement on the rules of the 
political game, broad participation in the voting process, and a promising 
economic environment), elections can promote stability.43  
 
This is very rarely the case in new democracies or democracies affected by some level of 
identity conflict. For example, ethnic conflict followed many states’ initial experiments 
with popular elections in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.44 An avoidance of 
such problems would seem to require that the actors most involved in the transition 
consider the fears and demands of political participants while attempting to establish and 
adhere to clear and equitable rules.  
 Linz and Stepan argue that the order of elections is important for avoiding or at 
least managing these problems. According to their analysis, national elections should be 
held first to encourage the framing of issues and positions on national terms. Political 
parties will then have an incentive to appeal to individuals from all groups in order to 
widen their support base. Winners of national contests will also need to make decisions 
on the basis of what is best for the entire country, rather than one community or region. 
                                                 
43
 Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear, 60. 
44
 Saideman, “Democratization,” 109. 
 26 
Conversely, if regional elections are held first, political actors have reasons to focus on 
narrower interests. In the process, the state comes to be viewed as a collection of distinct 
and competing regions rather than a unified whole.45 Linz and Stepan show that this was 
the case in Yugoslavia, where ethnic issues became dominant after the regional elections 
in 1990.   
 Given the contentious nature of elections in newly democratic countries, many 
theorists have drawn attention to the role of electoral systems in encouraging various 
political outcomes. Donald Horowitz, for example, argues, “The electoral system is by far 
the most powerful lever of constitutional engineering for accommodation and harmony in 
severely divided societies.”46 Benjamin Reilly, in his summary of institutional choices for 
new democracies, similarly notes that the “strategies of cooperation or antagonism” 
provided for by different electoral systems influence both election results and other 
political practices within democratic government.47 The importance of the first elections 
in shaping future party relations and political campaigns requires a consideration of how 
actors might react during the lead-up and holding of elections. This includes an 
acknowledgment of the ways elites frame the campaign and their effects on the process.  
 Voters in states where this is not sufficiently accounted for often end up 
perceiving elections as a zero-sum game. Accordingly, they believe their identity group 
must win in order to participate in any meaningful way in the government. This winner-
take-all mentality could be said to have influenced democratic elections in Nigeria, where 
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violent ethno-religious conflicts spread after the first election of a post-military regime. 
Ukoha Ukiwo writes, “…the majoritarian principle is problematic in plural societies 
because ethnic parties that lose elections tend to reject not only the election results but 
also the whole gamut of democratic institutions by appealing to violence.”48 Elections are 
symbolic in their signaling of the end of authoritarianism, and functional in their seating 
of a representative government. If they fail to bring all major groups into the democratic 
system, however, there is the risk that groups that perceive themselves slighted will resort 
to other, possibly violent means to voice their demands. 
 Beyond general agreement on the importance of electoral systems and their 
influence on political behavior, however, theorists have numerous stances on the 
specifics of institutional engineering. According to Reilly, this disagreement is largely on 
the lines of party list proportional representation versus alternative vote, single 
transferable vote, or other rules that incentivize the creation of ethnically or religiously 
heterogeneous political parties.49  In many ways this characterizes the debate over 
consociationalism versus centripetalism. There is continued discussion considering the 
merits of each system, but: 
Regardless of whether consociational or centripetal approaches (or some mixture 
of the two) are favored, there is widespread agreement among many scholars that 
some type of power-sharing government featuring all significant groups is an 
essential part of democracy-building in divided societies.50  
 
It is important that all groups are included and, as a result, invested in the government. 
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 Still, there cannot be said to be one electoral system or system of institutions that 
works best for all democracies in divided states. Much depends on context. As Reilly and 
Andrew Reynolds write:  
The optimal choice for peacefully managing conflict depends on several 
identifiable factors specific to the country, including the way and degree to which 
ethnicity is politicized, the intensity of conflict, and the demographic and 
geographic distribution of ethnic groups.51  
 
Additionally, the system most likely to bring an end to conflict may unfortunately not 
best provide for government effectiveness and eventual democratic consolidation. The 
role of elites and their willingness to cooperate and govern for the best of all communities 
is also crucial.  
 The challenges outlined above have led some observers to question whether 
democratic government is both feasible and desirable in states whose populations are 
divided along religious or ethnic lines. It should be acknowledged, however, that the 
presence of multiple identity groups within a state does not guarantee conflict nor prevent 
successful democratization. Rather, it matters more how the issues of uncertainty and 
competition are handled during the transition. The absence of functioning institutions and 
governmental ineffectiveness characteristic of early democracies means such regimes are 
unable to accommodate the demands of all new political actors. Still, institutionalized and 
rule-bound democracy remains the best option for managing identity conflict and 
addressing the demands and grievances of both communities and individuals.  
 Iraq has faced many of the challenges associated with democratization described 
here. Its sectarian and ethnic divisions were combined with a weak state and a collapse of 
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security. New political opportunities encouraged competition for control of the state by 
groups that had previously been marginalized, raising the stakes of electoral success and 
potential loss of power. As has been argued, it is in such contexts that relevant actors 
must recognize the potential for conflict and seek to ensure that the new democratic 
institutions include all groups. Though Iraq’s experience is in many ways not unique, its 
historical circumstances and progress to this point deserve attention and analysis in order 
to determine its potential success.  
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CHAPTER THREE: IDENTITY IN IRAQ – A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
 While conflict regarding the identities of Iraqis seems to have worsened since the 
U.S. invasion, uncertainty over the proper object of their loyalty has existed since the 
creation of the state. As Adeed Dawisha writes:  
The concern over Iraqi unity relates to the seeming gradual eclipse of a national 
Iraqi identity by sub-state, ethnosectarian identities. But that is hardly a unique or 
even contemporary phenomenon. Multiple identities and loyalties are as old as 
Iraqi history.52 
 
Over time, divisions have manifested between Sunni and Shia, Arab and non-Arab, and 
nationalism based on pan-Arabism and the territorial state. A better understanding of the 
historical development of Iraqi identity is crucial for an analysis of its modern democratic 
system and the prospects for its success. 
There was little sense of shared identity at the time of Iraq’s creation. The 
economy was based predominately on agriculture, with few towns. Tribal ties and kinship 
were the major determinants of relationships and there were limited links among people 
of different regions.53 Despite evidence that the geographic term “Iraq” was in use since 
the medieval era and increasingly by travelers and officials during the 1800s, it is unclear 
if the population viewed themselves in terms of territory. As Phebe Marr argues, Iraq was 
subject to “invasion, disruption, and discontinuity” beginning with the Mogul conquest in 
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the 13th century, and as a result, was “an environment in which a cohesive identity, 
especially one based on territory, did not easily take root.”54 In this view, the state of Iraq 
is largely artificial, composed of groups who have little in common in terms of history or 
culture.  
 Iraq is not unique in the challenges it has faced related to nation and state-
building, coupled with a history of invasion and foreign occupation. Gareth R.V. 
Stansfield notes this, writing:  
The logical progression of Western nation-building…starts out from ‘the state,’ 
goes through the constitution of a political nation inclusive of all citizens 
irrespective of class and geographic location and finally yields cultural 
homogeneity and cohesion,55  
 
an assumption completely absent in Iraq. Rather, Iraq is divided along sectarian and 
ethnic lines and composed of communities with historically little or no connection to the 
center. A state such as Iraq with no coherent, unified, national identity is not fertile for 
representative government in which political actors are expected to cooperate and 
compromise for the good of the entire country rather than their respective ethnic or 
sectarian identity groups. 
 Yet others argue that most Iraqis do consider themselves Iraqi first and Shia, 
Sunni, Turkoman, or Kurd second. Iraqi national unity exists “even after 35 years of 
wars, the brutal suppression of minority rights, and the continued assault on civil 
society.”56 If this is so, it is worth asking why sectarian identities have often conflicted 
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and violently reasserted themselves in the period following Saddam’s removal. The true 
nature of these divisions and the causes of their manifestation must be accounted for in an 
analysis of the democratic transition and the likelihood of democratic stability. If conflict 
among Iraq’s communities is based on primordial identities vying for their own state, Iraq 
may very well split along ethnonational lines. If, however, Iraq’s Sunnis, Shias, and 
Kurds are competing over the single entity of the Iraqi state, much as they have done 
throughout the country’s history, it is possible democracy can come to channel these 
conflicts through generally peaceful political institutions.   
In my view, a better understanding of Iraq and its peoples’ identity goes beyond 
the common artificial explanations and looks to the state’s legacy of poor leadership and 
an exclusionary political system. According to Stansfield:  
While…there is now competition between (and often within) groups for power in 
the post-2003 period over who controls the state, the struggles at the beginning of 
the twentieth century can more accurately be described as conflict between 
communal groups and the state.57  
 
The leaders of the nascent Iraqi state sought to control the population by promoting 
religious, ethnic, or tribal identities, and favoring certain segments of society as fit their 
goals. The consequent weakening of Iraqis’ civic identities remains problematic today, 
particularly in the aftermath of a war and the creation of a democratic process in which 
sectarian and ethnic identities have gained resonance.  
Great Britain was awarded the mandate for Iraq by the League of Nations in 1920. 
This mandate was to continue until the state was capable of self-sufficiency, an 
ambiguous deadline that assumed Great Britain would guide Iraq into political and 
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economic modernity. According to Thabit A.J. Abdullah, the mandate “…was a bitter 
blow to the country’s embryonic national leadership which had hoped for a rapid move to 
independence.”58 Furthermore, each of the new state’s provinces had a strong rural-urban 
divide and distinct realms of political and economic influence. For example, Basra was a 
distinct entity before the British invaded in 1914-1915 due to its proximity to the Gulf 
and trading networks with India and Iran. Baghdad, on the other hand, had cultural and 
economic ties to Persia and Instanbul, while Mosul was affiliated with present-day 
Syria.59 Abdullah argues further that “[o]f all the Ottoman provinces in the Middle East, 
those in Iraq had demonstrated a strong resistance to centralized rule.”60  
A degree of Iraqi nationalism did exist in the period following the mandate, due 
largely to the continued British presence and its seeming interference in the new state’s 
affairs. Consequently, Iraqi nationalists worked to rid the state of British control and to 
exercise political decisions free from Britain’s system of advisors. According to Eric 
Davis, “Although confessional differences had begun to appear, opposition to the British 
was still sufficient to override them.”61 This frustration and unity of purpose led to the 
Revolution of 1920, a large-scale uprising against the British in which all of Iraq’s 
communities participated.62 The uprising was evidence that Iraq’s communities, if 
properly motived, could unite and perceived themselves as a distinct entity being violated 
by a foreign power. 
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Still, sectarian divisions did influence the rebellion. For example, many powerful 
Sunnis held back their support anticipating that a successful ouster of the British would 
give the Shias power. Shia tribal leaders who had taken advantage of British patronage 
and owned large properties similarly resisted the rebellion in fear of what a new political 
order would bring. Finally, Kurds did not become involved and were hesitant of the 
prospect of an Iraqi state likely led exclusively by Arabs.63 Many Iraqis disliked the 
British, but the state and its resources and institutions were an object of competition for 
which Iraqis divided themselves largely along communal lines. 
 Despite the Iraqis’ frustration, the revolution was put down by Great Britain and 
Iraq remained under British control until 1932. The number of fatalities and war 
weariness at home led Great Britain to reassess its relationship with the new state and 
take steps to ease the tensions, including establishing a provisional government. They put 
the respected Sunni religious scholar and shaykh, Abdul-Rahman al-Gailani, as head, and 
filled the other positions mostly with Sunnis. Even so, Iraq’s Sunnis and Shias continued 
to find some areas for cooperation, as elites from both groups agreed on the creation of an 
Arab Islamic state with a monarchy and constitution.64 Kurds were largely excluded from 
these debates, but there existed hope that an equitable and representative system could be 
created. 
 The British deliberated among themselves over who should best lead Iraq. 
According to Dawisha, “divisions were so deep that when it came to choosing a ruler for 
the new state, the British realized that no local candidate could command the support of 
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the whole population.”65 Consequently, they offered the throne to Faisal bin al-Hussein, 
son of Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Mecca, leader of the 1916 Arab Revolt against the 
Ottoman Empire. Faisal had assisted Great Britain in the Arab Revolt, believing he would 
be rewarded with control of an independent Syria. However, Britain had also guaranteed 
France jurisdiction over Syria through a competing treaty known as the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. A declaration of Syrian independence by Faisal and other representatives in 
March 1920 was met with French resistence, and Britain chose to support its European 
ally rather than uphold the earlier agreement with Hussein and Faisal. The French army 
defeated Faisal in July 1920, and the new king was banished.66 
The British might have selected Faisal for the Iraq position because they felt a 
sense of guilt over their decision to defend the French claim. More importantly, however, 
Faisal was “a man who had come to terms with the British presence in the Middle 
East,”67 and thus was seen as a dependable source of stability. Additionally, he was a 
candidate supported by Britain’s Iraq allies. Faisal took power on August 23, 1921, after 
a referendum that boasted 96 percent of Iraqis accepted his appointment, a figure that was 
highly manipulated by the British.68  
 The 1925 constitution created a two-chamber parliament with elections, an 
independent judiciary, and a king who could exercise veto powers over any legislative 
decisions. The parliament was hardly representative, however, due to the questionable 
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legitimacy of the elections and the control exercised by powerful tribal leaders.69 In all, 
the biggest obstacle to political development in Iraq during this period was the inability 
of the central government to exercise authority over the entire country, coupled with a 
strong sense of separateness among the former Ottoman provinces. While Baghdad had 
long been a center of trade and culture, the fact that 80 percent of Iraqis lived in the 
countryside had no sense of an Iraqi national identity detracted from it being perceived as 
a legitimate administrative capital. 
Great political change led to a flux in traditional roles, spurred further by new 
market relationships and social interactions. The role of intellectuals was important 
during this period, as they encouraged a shift from an identity “grounded in religion, 
confessionalism, and traditional families to one based on education, technical expertise, 
and secular values.”70 In line with Western ideas, the elites advocated loyalty to the 
newly created nation-state and its institutions as opposed to traditional devotion to the 
Islamic community, emphasizing the importance of secular education and scientific 
progress. In general, however, a deeper allegiance to the state was limited mainly to 
educated, urban government officials and military members, as well as local landowners 
and wealthy elites who looked to the state for security and support. As Marr writes, “for 
the most part, this was a small, thin, mainly Sunni strata, and identification with the state 
was based more on patronage than positive fealty.”71  
Tribal relationships retained their significance and further prevented the creation 
of a civic identity that encompassed all Iraqis. Historically, tribal confederations known 
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as qabilas have formed an important part of many Iraqis’ identities, and most Iraqis can 
trace their familial ties to one of the nine qabila in place since the seventeenth century.72 
The British sustained tribal identity by creating laws that “privileged the ruling tribal 
stratum,”73 including the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation incorporated into 
the 1925 constitution. This law awarded loyal shaykhs administrative powers, including 
the collection of taxes, over their territories. By balancing competing forces against each 
other, these policies helped the British to maintain control and stem potential challenges 
to their rule.   
According to Martin Bunton, the British colonialists left a “primordialising 
legacy” in Iraq by allying themselves with tribal leaders.74 These leaders were seen as 
conservative and thus capable of ensuring social stability with little cost to the Great 
Britain. Many Shia realized their wellbeing was best secured by aligning with the central 
state and thus cooperated with these policies as well. However, both Sunni and Shia 
worked with the government based on their communal identities rather than their 
identities as Iraqis. Collaboration between the two communities took place in an 
environment where each was competing against the other for an increased share of state 
resources and political influence, a rivalry in which the Sunni usually prevailed.  
Sunni dominance in the new government and administration became more 
pronounced over time. Britain’s inclusion of a limited number of Shia was largely 
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nominal, and they held no real power. Furthermore, many Shia ulama who had 
participated in the 1920 uprising were banished to Iran, depriving the community of its 
religious and moral leaders. As a result, “Shia resentment at being excluded from the 
reins of power increased.”75 Though the majority of the population, Shias were 
underrepresented and remained so throughout the monarchy and the republic. This legacy 
of Sunni dominance and Shia bitterness remained an unsettled issue and became a source 
of conflict particularly during the transition to democracy after 2003. 
Historically, Sunni Arabs were favored under the Ottoman Empire and held the 
majority of its administrative positions. Furthermore, Sunnis formed the largest group in 
Iraq’s urban areas and thus were closer to the centers of power. The decision by the 
British to continue this trend reflected the fact that Sunnis were better educated and 
attended the modern state schools established in the area during the late 19th century. In 
contrast, most Shia had traditional educations from religiously-based schools. As Marion 
Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett write, “…when the Iraqi state was created in 1920, 
there were few qualified Shia able or willing to take part either in the leadership of the 
government or in the administration.”76 The Iraqi government, influenced by Great 
Britain, became comparably reliant on a narrow sector of the population for its power. 
Years of Ottoman favoritism towards the Sunni followed by similar British 
policies led many Shias to look to their own community for social and political direction. 
The Shia religious system and its recognized clerical leadership meant the group has 
historically had more distinct and self-serving institutions and a distinguishable 
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counteridentity.77 For example, Shias had separate courts, aid institutions, and other 
administrative organizations. It remains the case, however, that Sunnis and Shias lived in 
the same neighborhoods and often cooperated for business purposes. Additionally, 
according to Abdullah, Shias in Iraq embraced their Arab heritage and thus separated 
themselves from the Shia of neighboring Iran.78 Sources of unity were present, but were 
little encouraged by Iraq’s leaders or its political system. 
The state also marginalized its Kurdish population, most noticeably in the new 
leaders’ decision to establish Arabic as the language of the state and education. This had 
further implications for overall Iraqi identity, and according to Marr, “tended to open the 
door to a broader Arab identity, rather than one focused simply on the new state.”79 The 
tension between loyalty to the Iraqi state versus the larger Arab world was to remain an 
issue throughout Iraq’s development, and shaped the formation of the population’s 
identity for years to come. For the Kurdish case, in particular, it led them to look to their 
fellow Kurds, including those in neighboring states, rather than other Iraqis.  
The state’s lack of economic development during this formative period affected 
its citizen’s identities, as most Iraqis remained outside the formal economy until at least 
the oil boom of the 1950s. Consequently, the existence of:  
…a landholding class and a small urban elite, which controlled both wealth and 
power, left the bulk of the population without the ‘stake in society’ that supports 
identification with the state and its government.80 
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Individuals and groups that were excluded politically were also marginalized 
economically, leading to deeper frustrations with the status quo. Again, this situation 
served to encourage more narrow relationships and fewer linkages among Iraqis from 
different regions. 
Marr argues that the initial period after Iraq’s creation was “a missed opportunity 
to create a new identity grounded on a multiethnic, multisectarian basis.”81 The expansion 
of the central government’s power over distinct regions and the establishment of a 
parliamentary system and monarchy brought various segments of society into the state 
apparatus to a limited extent. However, the leaders were ultimately unsuccessful in this 
regard: “Iraq’s political class could have put more focus, over time, on these new 
institutions to embed them in the public consciousness and make them part of Iraq’s new 
identity,”82 and according to Marr, this was not adequately done. The state building 
project failed to involve the Kurds, Shia, and those Sunnis unconnected by patronage to 
the central government. 
Increased contact with the West during this period offered new political 
philosophies and understandings of group relations, including the concept of nationalism. 
Consequently, the possibility of an identity based on shared language gained followers in 
this time of transition. Pan-Arabism emerged as an alternative to either sectarian or state-
based identity. According to Abdullah, pan-Arabism:  
was primarily a reaction to colonial rule. It argued that modern Iraq, along with 
the rest of the Arab countries, was an artificial creation. Its natural identity could 
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not be separated from that of a single Arab nation stretching from Morocco to the 
Persian Gulf.83  
 
In this view, separate countries joined by language and history were to unite territorially 
and politically to regain strength in a post-colonial world.  
As Davis writes, “It was this tension between continuity and change that helps 
explain the rise of two competing definitions of political community, one Iraqist 
nationalist and one Pan-Arab, that began to vie for hegemony.”84 Iraqists, or those in 
favor of a narrower, state-based identity, were not opposed to relations with other Arab 
states, but placed greater emphasis on finding solutions to Iraq’s political and economic 
problems. Pan-Arabists, on the other hand, relegated domestic problems to the goal of 
Arab unity.85 The controversy over pan-Arabism versus state-based, Iraqi identity 
similarly influenced other Arab countries struggling with how best to gain power in a 
largely post-colonial world.  
Identity based solely on the Iraqi state generally attracted Shia, Kurds, and 
religious minorities. Conversely, pan-Arabism tended to appeal to Iraq’s tribal 
constituents, as the ideology was perceived to be reminiscent of the early Islamic empires 
and their communities of believers. Writes Davis, “Similar to tribal members who 
focused on blood ties rather than spatial location, the Pan-Arabists substituted ethnic 
purity for a more precise territorial definition of space.”86. This put Iraq’s communities at 
odds over the nature of the state. First, the Kurds were not Arab, and they might have 
better responded to an identity based on Iraq’s territory. Second, Shia, though Arab, 
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disliked the secular focus of Arab nationalism with its Sunni underpinnings and were 
fearful of a unified Arab state in which they would be a minority.87  
Despite these challenges, some of Iraq’s early leaders made a concerted effort to 
foster national unity. Under Faisal’s guidance in particular, important educational and 
cultural policies were put in place to encourage a unified Iraqi state. As Hala Mundhir 
Fattah and Frank Caso write, “Perhaps the one monarch who really tried to bridge the 
sectarian, ethnic, and political divisions in the early years was Faisal I.”88 He did so by 
training talented Shia for government positions and gave them responsibilities in the new 
state, and by ensuring that the established quotas were filled with members of the 
Kurdish community. While many participants in this project considered themselves Arab 
nationalists first, they believed state and Arab loyalty mutually enforcing, for “all the 
nationalist notions of love of country, a feeling of community, and a sense of 
togetherness, could be nurtured within the political boundaries of Iraq.”89 To these 
thinkers, a well-functioning state would benefit the Iraqi population and allow Iraq an 
important role in the Arab world.   
 The monarchy under Faisal’s successors, Ghazi I and Faisal II, continued to foster 
support across Iraq’s sectarian and economic groups. They tended to focus, however, on 
the most powerful tribes and families. Sunnis also resisted any meaningful inclusion of 
other groups and a potential loss of their privileged position. This prevented Iraq’s 
government from being truly representative. Fattah and Caso write: “…the Iraqi 
state…continued to rely on a narrow sector of the populace that formed the pillars of state 
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rule, the ex-Sharifians and the tribal shaykhs.”90 Sunni control extended even into 
provincial governments in Shia-majority districts91 Again, these policies fostered narrow 
and paternalistic identities rather than an inclusive understanding of Iraqi citizenry such 
as required for a participatory political system. 
In the last period of the monarchy, from 1946 to 1958, both Kurds and Shia had 
made important gains despite their continued underrepresentation. Multiple prime 
ministers were Kurdish or Shia, and the Kurds also fielded an important Minister of 
Interior.92 The army, parliament, and political parties were largely pluralist and offered 
promise for a more inclusive state.  Unfortunately, most of these institutions came to 
reaffirm the importance of close connections with the ruling elite.  As Fattah and Caso 
write, “for many national groups, loyalty to the Iraqi state was cultivated on the level of 
personalized ties, and relations between the emergent state and its constituents were 
shaped first and foremost by the growth of political patronage.”93 This further 
strengthened the tribal Sunni elements at the expense of Iraq’s other communities. 
This period further highlighted the dominance of the Sunni in Iraq’s political 
system and the implications this situation had for sectarian divisions. According to 
Dawisha, “…while the political fortunes of the Shia and, to a lesser extent, the Kurds 
varied from one period to the other, Sunni dominance over the political power structure 
was not challenged.”94 For example, between 1921 and 1936, only 5 out of 57 ministers 
were either Shia or Kurdish. In the monarchy period, until 1958, the prime minister and 
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ministers of defense, interior, finance, and foreign affairs were held nearly exclusively by 
Sunnis. This bias extended into positions of military leadership as well.95 The attainment 
of political power on the basis of sectarian identity served to highlight these divisions and 
frustrate the Shia and Kurdish populations. 
Political instability did not change the overwhelming preponderance of tribal and 
kinship identity as a marker of political power. Between the state’s creation and the end 
of the monarchy ten elections took place and over fifty cabinets were assembled. This did 
little to bring new interests or voices to the political process. As Abdullah writes, 
“Rarely…did these interruptions represent anything more than a reshuffling of posts.”96 
The tendency for personal connections to trump meritocratic considerations continued 
even as the state bureaucracy expanded and the central government was able to exert 
more influence on the periphery.  
This situation made it difficult for any Iraqis to view themselves as citizens of a 
unified state rather than members of ethnic and sectarian groups. According to Marion 
Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett:  
…while presumably intending to promote the formation of an integrated nation-
state, the governments under the mandate and monarchy in fact helped to 
reconstruct and perpetuate pre-capitalist and tribal relations through their tribal 
and land tenure policies.97 
 
Rather than reducing tribal identities, a phenomenon that began under the Ottomans, the 
British strengthened these ties and reduced the likelihood that the general population 
would identity with the state and its institutions. This situation created “the most 
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wretched future for the masses of the landless, impoverished tribesmen and peasants who 
suffered under the shaykhs’ whims,”98 thus depriving many of Iraq’s communities both 
economically and politically.   
A lack of economic development caused further discontent with the state and its 
representatives. Though oil revenues greatly increased during the 1950s, most resulting 
economic progress benefited the already prosperous landholders and other clients of the 
state. As Martin Bunton writes, “The result was greater patrimonialism: the state in fact 
became increasingly autonomous from the people and dependent on the interests of local 
elites and foreign companies, while ignoring the underlying poverty and inequity.”99 
Increased separation between the center and the majority of Iraqis who lived on the 
margins of state influence meant communities and regions remained disconnected from 
and unaffected by elite gains. 
 In 1968, after a series of coups and transfers of power, members of the Baath 
political party took control under Abdul Rahman Aref’s regime and named Ahmad 
Hassan al-Bakr president. The Revolutionary Command Council, a group controlled by 
the Tikriti tribe and belonging exclusively to the Talfah clan, became the new center of 
power. Though unpopular at first, the Baathists succeeded in passing social and economic 
programs that reached the peasants, young people, and members of trade unions. Amidst 
this increase in power, Saddam Hussein became president of the Revolutionary 
Command Council and consequently of Iraq in 1979.100  
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The ideology of Baathism was developed in Syria during the 1940s and centered 
on pan-Arab populism. Its proponents argued for the reunification of the Arab world to 
regain its historical destiny, a political philosophy filled with “references to an idealized 
and romanticized notion of the past.”101 Pan-Arabism’s appeal in Iraq was limited largely 
to the Sunni upper and middle classes, as they formed the majority of the urban 
populations, Baathists’ traditional centers of power. Additionally, the majority of the 
Arab world is Sunni, and Sunnis in Iraq saw their interests better served by joining in 
such a confederation. Their lack of support from other segments of the Iraqi population 
did not prevent the increasingly powerful Baathists from legitimizing their rule and 
silencing any opposition through calls to the interests of the Arab nation.102  
In the early Baath period, from 1968 to 1979, its leaders worked to modernize the 
economy, improve medical care and education, and build a strong middle class. Marr 
writes that “this trend…facilitated the erosion of ethnic, sectarian, and tribal 
identities.”103 In addition, urbanization accelerated, increasing by 30 percent over a thirty 
year period to 65 percent of the population in 1977. This brought a greater number of 
Iraqis, both urban and rural, into the state market. Despite continued Sunni dominance in 
state affairs, Shia businessmen were increasingly prosperous and more Shia gained 
technical expertise through expanded education104 Shia experienced less economic 
marginalization during this time, but were still highly underrepresented politically.  
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The late seventies were thus characterized by increasing regime support from 
wider segments of society, including Sunnis, Christians, and many educated Shias. As 
Davis writes:  
This was due in large measure to a deceptive political calm; the creation of a 
general welfare state; massive infrastructural development, including roads, 
electrification of villages, and new housing complexes; and the nationalization of 
foreign oil.105  
 
Still, much of the seemingly prosperous economy was tied heavily to the state and thus 
available to government exploitation. This led to insecurity on the part of many Iraqis, 
and a sense of suspicion toward the state and its institutions.106 Clear ties to the 
government and membership in the appropriate tribes were most crucial in securing 
inclusion in the state and the accompanying material benefits. 
The Baathist state worked to mask tensions through a project of identity focused 
on Mesopotamianiasm. Baathist leaders pointed to Iraq’s ancient civilizations as evidence 
of its rightful place in the Arab world and thus of the pride to which its citizens were 
rightfully entitled. The emphasis on this identity as opposed to the narrower Arab 
construction also served to minimize Iraq’s sectarian differences, for “Iraq’s 
Mesopotamian heritage was the only heritage to which all Iraqis – Sunni and Shia Arabs, 
Kurds, and other minorities alike – could unambiguously relate.”107  Though the ancient 
past was indeed a source of unity for all Iraq’s communities, there was no effort to take 
concrete steps towards greater inclusion and the political reality remained unchanged. 
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 Tribalism had lessened in influence by the mid-20th century, and the Baath party 
originally attempted to hasten this process, believing it harmful to Iraq’s transition to 
modernity. However, party leaders reversed their original position during the 1980s and 
1990s and promoted tribal solidarity to maintain the regime’s hold on power amidst war 
and economic hardship.108 In pursuit of this goal:  
…the Baath moved to appropriate folk culture and establish itself as the true 
representative of mass interests. To accomplish this, the regime used folklore to 
demonstrate values, norms, and cultural preferences that were distinctly Iraqi.109  
 
The membership of the Baath Party also underwent a shift, as army officers and 
intellectuals were replaced by individuals from the lower middle class whose identity was 
based largely on tribal relations.   
 Saddam was particularly influential in this development, as he portrayed himself 
supreme shaykh of Iraq to gain political capital. Though Saddam “sought to play down 
public consciousness and discussions of tribalism and confessionalism in Iraqi politics 
and society,”110 he realized its attractiveness in a populace still very much traditional. 
This ploy was especially effective in gaining support from Iraq’s rural areas. Lastly, 
tribalism was expedient in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war as Saddam implemented 
symbols from the famed Battle of Qadisiya, in which Islam armies defeated Persia in 636, 
to rally Iraqis. Despite economic and political progress, Saddam undertook a deliberate 
identity-building project that returned people to their most basic understandings of the 
nation and its cultural ties. 
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Donald Malcolm Reid engages in an interesting study of Iraqi postage stamps to 
portray Saddam’s ongoing manipulation of Iraqi identity for his regime’s purposes. He 
writes: “Iraqi postage stamps provide a significant gauge of the images that Saddam 
Hussein wanted to project and of Iraq’s turbulent political course through the twentieth 
century.”111 For example, stamps depict Saddam as a military leader going into battle 
against Iran, a father comforting a child, a Muslim traveling to Mecca, and a 
traditionally-dressed Arab leader. These images reflect the importance of symbols in 
Saddam’s Iraq and the role they played in promoting a particular identity depending upon 
the regime’s aims. Saddam’s picture was increasingly visible in public displays and the 
media during this time as well, serving to increase loyalty to him and emotional bonds to 
the Baathist party.  
As the Baathist’ use of tribalism was focused largely on the segments most 
closely related to its own Sunni base of power, the Shia community was further alienated. 
According to Davis:  
Sunni Arab Iraqis, particularly those drawn from the rural tribal nexus upon 
which the Takriti Ba’th based its power, enjoyed privileged access to the state – 
including its administrative arm, the cultural bureaucracy, the diplomatic corps, 
the military, the police, and the security services – by virtue of being a member of 
this ethnic group.112 
 
Shias did gain power, but as individuals rather than a constituency. Furthermore, Shias 
required well-connected Sunnis to retain their positions and to gain additional power.  
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Bunton links the regime’s increasing use of symbology to produce support to the 
reality of economic hardship and the challenges it posed for the system of patronage. He 
writes:  
As the distributive ability of the regime diminished and material rewards came to 
be confined to ever smaller circles of the regime’s core supporters, themselves 
becoming defined in cultural terms rather than in programmatic, ideological or 
civic terms, its reliance on religious, ethnic and cultural factors in its relationship 
to wider sectors of the population would only grow.113  
 
The identity-building project was not accompanied by any development in the political or 
economic spheres, however, and thus failed to meaningfully incorporate those segments 
of the population Saddam was attempting to co-opt. Though many urban Shias had 
benefited from the prosperity of the 1970s, the wars of the 1980s and 1990s and Iraq’s 
ensuing economic crisis made such patronage much rarer.  
The Iran-Iraq war was an important point in the formation of Iraqi identity, as the 
majority of Iraqi citizens’ support of their state seemed to trump ethnosectarian 
considerations. Most Shia fought with Iraq, and many Kurds also joined the fight. Davis 
argues:  
These two elements – the ability of Iraqis from all ethnic groups to work together 
in what is probably the most complex of human activities, war making, and the 
demonstration of their commitment to Iraqi nationalism – should dispel the idea 
that Iraq is an artificial nation-state.114  
 
Iraqi elites capitalized on this sentiment, emphasizing the unity of Shia and Sunni Arabs 
in the defeat of Persian infidels. The war also marked an attempt by Saddam and his 
regime to promote Islam as a unifying identity. In a break with the secular ideology of 
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Baathism, Saddam held Islamic conferences and was photographed at religious sites to 
portray his regime as in line with Islamic values and religiously legitimated.115  
However, it cannot be denied that the time leading up to the war was 
characterized by increasing frustration with the Baathist state on the part of the Shia, 
Kurds, and other opposition movements. The eight-year conflict left 400,000 Iraqis dead 
or wounded and cost the country an estimated $128 billion, with between $100 and $120 
billion in foreign debt.116 Great economic hardship in the form of high inflation and 
unemployment only furthered the processes of political and social repression. Middle 
class Iraqis suffered the worst, as their wages were decimated by the inflation.117  
Saddam’s regime also suffered as it was no longer able to provide the services 
through which it had engendered support. The regime pursued economic liberalization 
policies during this time as well, which only intensified the gap in wealth and accentuated 
the division between those close to the centers of power and those on the edges. The 
government put rations in place in an attempt to deal with the adversity, but this merely 
allowed them to reward certain groups for their loyalty and thus hardened the ethnic and 
sectarian lines already apparent. Since the state was increasingly unable to provide 
economic benefits, many Iraqis looked within their smaller communities of tribe or 
family to gain jobs and other needed welfare services.118  
Oil prices dropped dramatically during 1990 and reduced Iraq’s annual revenues 
by nearly $7 billion. Saddam responded to such hardship by accusing Kuwait and the 
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United Arab Emirates of intentionally exporting more than their quotas under OPEC and 
thus driving the price down. He also alleged that Kuwait had illegally drilled from Iraqi 
wells near their shared border. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait began on August 2, 1990, and 
was condemned nearly immediately by the United Nations Security Council. Coalition 
forces liberated Kuwait on February 28, 1991, soon after the launch of Operation Desert 
Storm.119  
In addition to further economic sanctions, Saddam was faced by a March 1991 
revolt of all of the northern Kurdish-dominated and southern Shia-dominated provinces. 
Though President George Bush had called for the Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam 
during the coalition’s campaign, help never materialized and Saddam’s military defeated 
the fractured and unorganized opposition.120 The crackdown by the Republic Guard 
resulted in many casualties and a mass exodus of Kurds to Iran and Turkey and Shia to 
Saudi Arabia. Only after threat of U.S. military action did Iraq forces withdraw from their 
campaign of atrocity. As a result, the U.S., United Kingdom, and France created 
protected havens in the north, for the Kurds, Turkmen, and other small minorities, and in 
the south, for mostly Shia Arabs.121 
While Saddam had attempted to promote his government as meritocratic and Iraq 
as unified, the regime’s handling of the Shia and Kurdish rebellions in 1991 greatly 
changed his rhetoric. According to Dawisha, “Saddam would no longer feel the need to 
apologize for a brazenly ethnosectarian rule centered on family, clan, and tribe from his 
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own Sunni heartland.”122 As evidence, he blamed the 1991 Intifada on a “foreign 
conspiracy…intended to undermine Iraq’s national identity, as well as its collective mind, 
conscience, and sensitivities.”123 He also accused Iraq’s minorities of causing Turkish 
and Iranian intrusions in modern times, and thus further threatening the state. It was 
during this time that support of any association opposed to Baathism became a crime 
punishable by death.124  
 Davis summarizes the effect of Saddam’s heightened rhetoric towards Iraq’s non-
Sunni communities:  
In referring to ‘the enemies of Iraq and the Arabs,’ Saddam pit[ted] urban Sunni 
and tribal Arabs against the Shia and non-Arabs. In using the Sunni Arab 
community’s values and history as a standard by which to measure all other 
ethnic groups, Saddam asserts that, at its core, Iraq is a Sunni Arab state.125  
 
These comments engendered Saddam to poorer segments of the Sunni community, who 
appreciated his praise of tribal culture and values.  Additionally, “...the Iraqi leader’s 
arguments were intended to reinforce fears that Iraq could break apart if marginal groups 
acquired political power.”126 Such a sentiment had a number of adherents from among the 
Shia and Kurdish middle classes, too, as they feared the economic and social instability 
that might occur if a major political shift were to occur.  
The state was vital in appropriating resources and controlling who had access to 
goods and services during this period of economic hardship. Accordingly, over 16 million 
Iraqis were dependent on the assistance of the regime. Saddam used this control to 
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reward loyalty, seizing the property of individuals he saw as a threat to the regime and 
then redistributing them largely to members of the Sunni provinces’ tribes. As Abdullah 
writes, “In the absence of many state services, people resurrected old social institutions 
such as tribes or various other communal networks for support. Sectarianism and 
tribalism received encouragement from the state, especially after the 1991 uprising.”127 
This served to increase competition and consequently identification along ethnic and 
sectarian lines. 
At the time of the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraqis were living under a repressive 
police state with little hope of political progress or economic improvement. Most 
important for the democracy-building project the U.S. was about to embark on, most of 
Iraq’s population looked to sources other than the state for economic and social support. 
This did not include a select segment of the Sunni community, whose favored status 
under Saddam by virtue of being members of his clan gave them the most to lose with 
regime change. Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett conclude:  
Sectarianism, localism, and other forms of communal solidarity were reinforced 
largely because the powerlessness of the individual vis-à-vis an arbitrary political 
system...had the effect of forcing men and women to resort to ‘pre-state’ networks 
of sect, locality, or family.128  
 
Though the state had been in existence for over 80 years, most Iraqis were not much 
closer to an Iraq-based loyalty than their ancestors had been at the beginning of Faisal’s 
nation-building endeavors.   
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Iraq is indeed divided along sectarian lines, but this is due less to the existence of 
primordial identities and ancient hatreds than political and social authoritarianism and 
economic hardship. As Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett wrote in 1991, in Iraq:  
…patriarchal values and ties of family, clan, locality, tribe, and sect continue to 
be reproduced, since the existence of a highly dictatorial and repressive regime 
for more than two decades has operated against their disintegration.129  
 
These conditions prevented the formation of a unified, civic-based identity despite 
decades of shared territory and the presence of basic bureaucratic institutions. The 
tensions among communities after years of competition over limited state resources and 
political power came to the fore with the removal of Saddam and his regime and a greater 
deal of freedom than had been experienced in generations. 
However, historically there have been no indications that Iraq’s Shias, Kurds, or 
Sunnis desire independent states as opposed to a greater share of power and resources 
within the existing territorial boundaries. While it can be argued that most individuals in 
the state do consider themselves Iraqis, it is also the case that at times other identities 
have had greater salience depending on the government’s ability to provide 
representation and goods and services. Dawisha argues:  
For the national idea to compete with sub-national particularistic loyalties, the 
state has to literally woo the citizens away from their ethnosectarian comfort 
zone. The state needs to show that the interests of the citizen will be served best 
(and sometimes exclusively) by the state, not the tribe, clan, sect, or region.130  
 
It is in this context that the processes of institution building and democratic government 
play an important role. Though democracy in Iraq has faced countless challenges so far, a 
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political system based on the representation of all interests and equality under the law 
may offer the best hope of an inclusive and stable state. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: U.S. MISTAKES POST-2003 
 Iraq’s history of poor governance and non-representative institutions created deep 
obstacles to democratization. The United States’ invasion of the country and subsequent 
decision-making in many ways worsened the already challenging environment. The 
question of whether or not the U.S. should have invaded Iraq will not be addressed here, 
though the mistakes made by policymakers lead one to conclude that the U.S. was 
unprepared for the challenges to come regardless of original intent. An analysis of Iraq’s 
experiences with conflict and identity politics following Saddam’s removal and the role 
of American policies in contributing to such experiences is important in understanding 
the state’s continued challenges. Yet it can still be concluded that despite nearly a decade 
of intersectarian and political struggles, most actors have decided to participate in the 
democratic processes in Iraq thus enhancing its legitimacy.   
 The period immediately following the U.S. invasion was characterized by wide 
challenges related to institution building, infrastructure repair, and the provision of health 
services, education, and other social needs. Larry Diamond summarizes the dramatic 
difficulties: 
The state as an institution had to be restructured and revived. Basic services had 
to be restored, infrastructure repaired, and jobs created. Fighting between 
disparate ethnic, regional, and religious groups – many of them with well-armed 
militias – had to be prevented or preempted. The political culture of fear, distrust, 
brutal dominance, and blind submission had to be transformed. Political parties 
and civil society organizations working to represent citizen interests, rebuild 
communities, and educate for democracy had to be assisted, trained, and 
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protected. A plan needed to be developed to produce a broadly representative and 
legitimate new government, and to write a new constitution for the future political 
order. And sooner or later, democratic elections would need to be held.131 
 
The United States did not adequately plan for such hardships, and its mishandling 
contributed to a decade of sectarian and other conflict that continue to challenge Iraq’s 
democratic transition. The lack of preparation by the U.S. also created Iraqi resentment 
toward attempts to promote stability and democracy. 
 First, and perhaps most importantly, the architects of the U.S. invasion did not 
fully grasp the challenges that lay ahead concerning Iraq’s sectarian divisions. Thabbit 
Abdullah argues, for example, that “hardly anyone understood the culture, history, or 
socio-political complexity of the country.”132 As shown in the previous section, divisions 
along sectarian and tribal lines were still prevalent in the early 21st century, a situation 
worsened by economic and social hardship, and in particular, decades of totalitarian rule. 
More specifically, U.S. policymakers did not adequately consider how the loss of power 
on the part of Sunnis would lead to resistance to both American efforts and the 
democratic project in general. This miscalculation led to conflict and instability, 
especially on the part of Sunnis who were increasingly worried about their interests under 
a Shia-led government.  
Numerous scholars have also drawn attention to the shortened time frame within 
which many decisions regarding the invasion were made. While the Pentagon began 
formally planning the attack on Iraq in November 2001, few calculations extended 
beyond the initial invasion and taking of Baghdad. According to Thomas E. Ricks, once 
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the Bush administration realized many of its initial calculations were mistaken, it 
“hurried its diplomacy, short-circuited its war planning, and assembled an agonizingly 
incompetent occupation.”133 The haste with which many determinations were made was 
again symptomatic of an inadequate awareness of Iraqi society and the challenges that 
would likely arise. Furthermore, the administration largely failed to consult with those 
most knowledgeable of the region or critics within or outside of the planning councils 
who offered views contrary to its own. 
 The United States also incorrectly assumed that Iraq’s oil wealth would be 
sufficient to fund the reconstruction of the country. Paul Wolfowitz, a leading architect of 
the invasion, in particular believed Iraq’s oil wealth would pay for most of its postwar 
rebuilding, estimating that soon after Saddam’s removal the state would generate $15-20 
billion per year in exports.134 In making such predictions, the U.S. revealed it 
underestimated the damage done to Iraq’s infrastructure and economic system after 
decades of state mismanagement and international sanctions. The Iraqi economy had for 
years been based largely on ties to Saddam and the central government, providing 
individuals and businesses limited experience with the market or international economy. 
 Iraq’s sectarian divisions and potential problems were compounded by the threats 
the invasion posed to the middle class that crossed and linked communities, a point made 
by Abdullah. He notes that the Iraqi middle class has “historically been most supportive 
of a secular Iraqi nationalist outlook,” and thus an identity beyond simple sectarian 
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divisions.135 The middle class’s struggles began with the economic downturn of the 
1980s and worsened under sanctions. The tumult of the post-2003 period further 
damaged their standing and led many to flee the country, removing a major source of 
stability and potential assistance in the state’s reconstruction.  
 In terms of military action, the troop levels placed in Iraq were not sufficient to 
secure order after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Policymakers and members of the military 
assumed the conflict would be short, with no need for a long-term commitment of troops 
or resources.136 Ricks draws particular attention to this deficit, noting: “The irony is that 
in eighteen months of planning, the key question was left substantially unaddressed: what 
to do after getting Baghdad.”137 Many within the administration believed that after the 
invasion most of Iraq’s political institutions would remain in place, with the only change 
being to those in positions of power. As such, few plans were made in terms of how to 
provide security and services in absence of a functioning and cooperative Iraqi 
government.  
 Ricks analyzes the failures of the American occupation of Iraq by pointing to 
three false assumptions on which the plan was based. First, planners believed large 
numbers of Iraqi security forces were willing and able to support the occupation. Though 
a few exiled Iraqis gave advice to the U.S. in the lead up to the invasion, there was no 
indication that others would similarly cooperate. Second, the Bush administration 
assumed the international community would assist where their efforts were insufficient. 
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According to Ricks, however, “it is not clear what this assumption was based on, given 
the widespread and building opposition to the U.S. led invasion.”138 Finally, as mentioned 
earlier, most post-invasion plans were founded on a belief that a new Iraqi government 
would assemble and take over shortly after Saddam’s removal. U.S. policymakers did not 
appreciate that the Iraqi government prior to the invasion consisted mainly of patronage 
linkages based on one’s relation to Saddam and his favored tribes, with few modern 
bureaucratic structures to sustain the state. 
 For example, American forces were stationed in urban areas with no 
understanding of their duties or with who they needed to work. One consequence of this 
planning failure was the spread of looting in the major cities following the invasion, an 
unexpected scenario for which U.S. troops were unprepared. According to Kenneth M. 
Pollack, “The result was an outbreak of lawlessness throughout the country that resulted 
in massive physical destruction coupled with a stunning psychological blow to Iraqi 
confidence in the United States, from neither of which has the country recovered.”139 The 
U.S. mismanagement of this crisis signaled the security and political problems to come, 
all seemingly stemming from a lack of understanding on the part of the Americans and 
the consequent growing distrust of the project by the Iraqis. 
 More generally, there was little communication between Iraq and the U.S. in 
terms of the latter’s goals and approaches and the former’s needs and concerns. Anthony 
H. Cordesman argues that the post-invasion plan for the government, police, and military:  
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…needed to be proclaimed before, during, and immediately after the initial 
invasion to win the support of Iraqi officials and officers who were not linked to 
active support of Saddam Hussein and past abuses, and to preserving the core of 
governance that could lead to the rapid creation of both a legitimate government 
and security.140  
 
This included conveying to the Shia that they would gain power following elections, to 
the Sunni that they would be included in the statebuilding project and protected from 
persecution, and to the Kurds that their cooperation was vital in Saddam’s absence.141 
Such plans would not have satisfied all concerned parties, but might have reduced some 
uncertainty. It is possible, of course, that the U.S. itself was unsure how such political 
development would proceed, reducing its ability to communicate such information to 
Iraqi citizens. 
 The lack of participation by the United Nations and other international 
organizations in much of the planning and post-invasion reconstruction was also a 
contributing factor to the period’s security and political problems. According to Pollack:  
The United Nations, through its various agencies, can call upon a vast network of 
personnel and resources vital to various aspects of nation-building. One of the 
greatest problems the United States faced was that it simply did not have enough 
people who knew how to do all of the things necessary to rebuild the political and 
economic systems of a shattered nation.142  
 
The United Nations was experienced with post-conflict political reconstruction and 
peacebuilding through its work in Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, and elsewhere, but 
became frustrated by continued U.S. unilateralism in many of its decisions. In most cases 
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the United States did not have the right people with adequate knowledge of how to 
reconstruct Iraq both politically and economically while addressing its unique challenges. 
 Perhaps the most dramatic action with the most long-standing consequences was 
the U.S. decision to undertake a de-Baathification campaign as part of Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order No. 1 on May 16, 2003. This order proclaimed that no 
member of the top four ranks of the Baath party could be a part of the new government, 
putting 20-40,000 people out of work. F. Gregory Gause III notes:  
Everyone agreed that it [the Order] would strip the new Iraqi government of the 
experienced cadre of managers who had made the old one work. They just 
disagreed on whether that was a good thing or not.143  
 
For the American policymakers, de-Baathification was an important indication that 
Saddam’s regime was gone and a new era in Iraqi political life had begun. Conversely, 
de-Baathification removed the few people who had experience administering a state, 
many of who were Baathist’ party members only for employment purposes. De-
Baathification also strengthened many Iraqis’ feelings of uncertainty over their place in 
the American-led transition.  
 Another contentious decision was the disbandment of the Iraqi military and 
security services. It is true that many soldiers simply left, and it is unclear whether the 
army would have been a major source of stability during the transition had it remained in 
place.144 However, the Army, unlike forces loyal only to Saddam, was a national 
institution that included members of all communities and thus might have provided some 
constancy and reassurance to Iraqis concerned by the U.S. project. At a minimum, an 
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attempt should have been made to negotiate with the Iraqi forces in hopes of including 
them in the rebuilding efforts.145 Rather, the United States’ actions exemplified:  
the failure to entice, cajole, or even coerce Iraqi soldiers back to their own 
barracks or other facilities where they could be fed, clothed, watched, retrained, 
and prevented from joining the insurgency, organized crime, or the militias.146  
 
There was no attempt to train the former soldiers for employment and reintegration into 
Iraqi society, frustrating them and increasing their distrust of the United States’ motives 
and actions.  
Both of these decisions imposed major changes on Iraqis already unsure of the 
future and their position in the new state system. Though they might have supported 
Saddam’s removal, many were worried by such drastic developments. Abdullah 
summarizes:  
…it is not too far-fetched to assume that the various security forces under Saddam 
numbered in the region of 100,000 highly trained, well-connected individuals 
with access to money and arms. As the allies swept through the country in 2003, 
these Saddam-loyalists went underground and waited to see what the new order 
held for them. [L. Paul] Bremer’s decision to abolish the army and the Baath party 
settled the matter.147 
  
Many went on to join the insurgency or other rebel forces, seeking to prevent other U.S.-
led changes that were seemingly being taken at the expense of average Iraqis. 
 Bremer, director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
and later the Coalition Provisional Authority, also set out on a process of economic 
liberalization, believing the free market best suited to provide the economic development 
Iraq so desperately needed. He started by eliminating unsuccessful state-run industries, 
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intending to reduce state control of the economy and to allow markets to function. 
However, “this had the political effect of further alienating the middle class, which 
already had been hit by de-Baathification, and which was full of managers from those 
inefficient industries.”148 Other decisions had similar outcomes, with the ending of 
agricultural subsidies, for example, as an especially harsh blow to struggling rural Iraqis. 
According to Eric Davis, these decisions suggested a lack of understanding on the part of 
the Bush administration of how traditional Iraqis viewed the state and its obligations to its 
citizens, and amounted to “shock therapy” to an already damaged society.149 
As it became increasingly clear that an Iraqi democracy would not easily emerge, 
the United States began work to establish basic political institutions. American officials 
had wanted to cede control to the Iraqis as soon as possible, but it was apparent 
democratic elections would not likely promote the U.S. interests of creating a stable and 
supportive government. Consequently, in May 2003 the U.S. created the Coalitional 
Provisional Authority (CPA) in hopes of restoring some political and economic order. 
The CPA instituted a number of needed reforms and steps towards democracy, including 
freedom of speech, association, and the press, and allowed room for the growth of non-
governmental organizations such as charities.150 Unfortunately, the political and military 
divisions were largely American-led and thus viewed unfavorably and with suspicion by 
the Iraqis, some of who increasingly considered the U.S. presence an occupation.151  
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The CPA also effectively introduced a political system based on Iraq’s sectarian 
divisions rather than a more unified Iraqi identity, an outcome that many analysts believe 
has characterized Iraqi institutions since. According to Abdullah:  
…the CPA’s simplistic understanding of Iraqi society as being essentially divided 
into three antagonistic communities left its imprints on the reforms and tended to 
deepen, rather than dampen, the rising ethno-sectarian mood.152  
 
While its designers sought to ensure all Iraq’s communities were represented, the 
formation of the CPA along ethnic and sectarian lines reinforced the divisions rather than 
ameliorating them. The CPA also suffered from disorganization and incompetence, 
making it a difficult partner for both the Iraqis and the American military leaders with 
whom it was supposed to be allied.153 
Increased pressure for a transfer of power to an Iraqi interim government led the 
United States to appoint a 25-member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in July 2003. 
Despite this development, “…Bremer made it clear that he would continue to exercise 
supreme power.”154 Though the Americans sought to exercise power over the important 
decisions the nascent Iraqi government was likely to make, it is possible their 
micromanagement of the process actually preempted necessary political progress. 
Diamond writes:  
…the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq probably would have 
proceeded much more rapidly and successfully – with far less violence – if the 
United States had accepted UN appeals to transfer power early on to a broad-
based Iraqi interim government chosen through a process of inclusive 
participation and transparent consultation.155  
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It is debatable whether the Iraqis were ready to govern so soon after authoritarian rule, 
but U.S. control did not adequately involve the population in their new political system 
and furthered perceptions that the project was an occupation. 
Unsurprisingly, then, the IGC was mostly ineffective and distrusted. According to 
Diamond:  
The IGC was never able to agree on a formula for political transition, partly 
because of its own deep internal divisions along philosophical, ethnic, and 
sectarian lines; and partly because its members resented not having real power.156  
 
Again, the creation of the IGC was based on a top-down approach that did not allow the 
time necessary for government and political processes to build naturally and with 
sufficient Iraqi participation. Pollack argues that this was to some extent due to an 
American desire to put the Iraqis in charge and thus responsible for the inevitable 
political and economic challenges.157 More generally, the formation of the IGC on 
sectarian lines signaled to Shia parties such as Daawa and the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq that their partisan foundations were acceptable and perhaps 
even expected.158 
Many of the IGC’s problems were due to the lack of capable leaders truly 
representative of the Iraqi people. This was partly a symptom of Saddam’s desire to 
either coopt or eliminate any non-Baathist individuals who were effective and 
endangered his grasp on power. Additionally, as Pollack writes: 
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…because Washington had not allowed enough time – let alone created the 
circumstances – for genuinely popular figures to emerge, the CPA simply 
appointed twenty-five Iraqi leaders well-known to them.159  
 
A few were recognized and respected in their communities, but some were completely 
unfamiliar, and others largely disliked or even leaders of militias. This gap in leadership 
did nothing to reassure the Iraqi people that their interests would be represented and 
lobbied for in the new government. 
IGC’s weaknesses also negatively affected subsequent Iraqi governments, 
particularly in the spread of corruption and cronyism among new politicians. Many IGC 
members used the new resources available to them to build up their own power and 
security services at the expense of building a more effective, unitary state.160 
Furthermore, and perhaps most damaging, “they used the instruments of government to 
exclude their political rivals from gaining any economic, military, or political power,”161 
strengthening the perception among Sunnis and others that the American-produced 
democratic system would be Shia-dominated and dangerous to their interests. In many 
Iraqis’ view, the new democracy was neither representative nor equitable, and to some, it 
was threatening. 
More specifically, the IGC included only one Sunni tribal leader, and his standing 
within his community was questionable. The make-up and actions of the IGC, combined 
with the process of de-Baathification, made it clear to Sunnis, and particularly those close 
to Saddam, that their years in power had ended and the prospects of future political 
dominance were bleak. As Pollack writes:  
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All of these strategies had been previously employed by the Sunnis themselves 
under Saddam; thus, the Sunnis became convinced that in the new Iraq they 
would be oppressed just as they had once oppressed the Shia and the Kurds.162 
  
A lack of hope for the future and distrust in the Shia and Kurds under the guidance of the 
Americans led many Sunnis to resist other political progress or to join the growing 
insurgency. 
A plan for transition was subsequently created by the United States and more or 
less imposed on the IGC. The plan, which came to be known as the November 15 
Agreement, set the end of the political occupation at June 30, 2004. More specifically, the 
IGC was to draft and adopt a “Transitional Administrative Law” by February 28th to 
establish and structure power until a democratic government was elected under a 
permanent constitution.163 Though advances towards a more representative and 
autonomous government were needed, many viewed the timing considerations as based 
more on the Bush administration’s desire to show progress during the 2004 American 
presidential campaign than on the best interests of Iraq’s democracy.164 
The November 15 Agreement originally specified that a 15-member Organizing 
Committee representing all of Iraq’s 18 provinces would select members to a caucus. The 
caucus would then elect members to a Transitional National Assembly, after which a 
prime minister, cabinet, and three-member presidential council would be appointed. This 
system allowed significant, though indirect, control of the government by the U.S. and its 
Iraqi allies. However, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most revered figure in Shia 
Islam and spiritual leader of the Iraqi Shia community, issued a fatwa in opposition to the 
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plan.165 He argued that the constituent assembly had to be elected rather than appointed; 
as is, the plan was “undemocratic and a plot to prevent the Shia from realizing their 
rightful place in Iraqi society.”166 The U.S. reluctantly agreed to Sistani’s demands, 
recognizing his weight in the Shia community. 
The decision was made to implement a proportional representation electoral 
system with a single nationwide district. This determination was based on a number of 
factors, including the simplicity with which it could be implemented and an avoidance of 
the question of districts and vote apportionment because of lack of census data.167 As part 
of this system, voters were to choose political entities, whether parties, coalitions of 
parties, or individuals.168 Though many criticized the complexity of the November 15 
Agreement, its creators and supporters argued that the many stipulations were necessary 
to achieve a representative body filled by popular Iraqis rather than exiles or militia 
leaders.169  
The question of the timing of Iraq’s first elections was also up for debate. There 
was disagreement over whether postponing elections would allow more time for the 
building of civil society and informal democratic institutions or rather, would further 
delegitimize the present, unelected government. According to Diamond:  
Ill-timed and ill-prepared elections do not produce democracy, or even political 
stability, after conflict. Instead, they may only enhance the power of actors who 
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mobilize coercion, fear, and prejudice, thereby reviving autocracy and even 
precipitating large-scale violent strife.170  
 
Conversely, delaying elections might further marginalize and perhaps radicalize those 
who perceive themselves excluded from the government and thus the power to make 
important decisions. 
In the Iraqi case, elections were increasingly demanded as the means to transfer 
power away from the U.S. and towards elected representatives. However, it can be 
argued that insufficient time was allowed to prepare the Iraqi people for the processes of 
electoral government and that the contests institutionalized many of the CPA and IGC’s 
problems. The November 15 Agreement seemed to establish important political 
development, but the quickness with which it was produced lessened its appeal to the 
Iraqi people. Accordingly, “it was never vetted with a broad cross-section of Iraqi 
society, and thus there was no sense among Iraqis of ownership of the new transition 
plan.”171 These feelings did little to assuage Iraqi fears of an American occupation and 
Sunni expectations of a system that would be dominated by Shia and Kurdish interests.  
Iraq experienced increased sectarian violence in the lead up to elections, causing 
many to question if the political contest would in fact stabilize the country and put it on 
the path towards independent democracy. By 2005, for example, there was an average of 
70 attacks per day.172 Most of the violence was on the part of local Sunni groups opposed 
to the presence of the United States. Some Sunnis also joined al-Qaeda and fighters from 
other countries who sought to capitalize on Iraqi instability and use the state as a base for 
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its operations.173 Conflict attributable to anti-American sentiment increased among the 
Shia community as well, especially among followers of the highly influential Shia cleric 
Muqtada al-Sadr.174 
Though violence was generally portrayed as intersectarian, Iraq’s communities 
are not monolithic and fighting among communities was often accompanied by fighting 
within them. Furthermore, despite the tendency of the United States to treat most Sunnis 
as former Baathists and supporters of Saddam, many were glad to see him go yet 
disappointed by the U.S. treatment of the Sunni  population. Roel Meijer writes:  
For although they had depended on the Baathist state to defend their interests, 
many Sunnis also suffered under Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship and feel 
deeply humiliated and dishonored by the collective punishment the United States 
has meted out to their community.175  
 
In many cases, conflict came about as a result of uncertainty, a situation worsened by the 
inability of imperfect institutions and inadequate security to establish law and order and 
reassurance for Iraq’s Sunnis.  
There was excitement among large segments of the Iraqi population about the 
upcoming elections despite these security challenges. Many of the newly formed political 
parties participated in training and information programs designed to assist in the 
transition and to encourage wide participation. However:  
…the continuing terrorist and insurgent violence obstructed economic 
reconstruction, eroded Iraqi confidence in the appointed Interim Government, and 
raised serious doubts about the country’s capacity to stage elections by the 
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January 31 deadline that would be sufficiently inclusive, transparent, fair, and free 
of violence and intimidation to be considered ‘reasonably credible.’176  
 
While the Shia and Kurdish communities were especially enthusiastic about the contests, 
violence and urgent social and economic demands detracted from what was to be a 
monumental moment in Iraq history. The prospects of creating a democracy in the midst 
of pressing challenges and Sunni opposition were for many questionable.  
Even so, elections to the 275-seat Transitional National Assembly took place on 
January 30, 2005, along with elections to provincial assemblies in each of Iraq’s 18 
provinces and a regional assembly in Kurdistan. Over 7,000 candidates organized into 
multi-party coalitions, single parties, and individuals competed for seats in the National 
Assembly, and around 9,000 candidates in party slates looked to fill the provincial and 
Kurdistan seats. According to the system of closed list proportional representation, any 
slate that secured at least 31,000 votes, or around 1/275 of the vote, received a seat. As 
intended, the elected Assembly appointed the presidency council composed of a president 
and two deputies, a prime minister, and a cabinet.177 
These elections witnessed a 58 percent participation rate among registered voters, 
with the 275-seat Transitional National Assembly split largely among three blocs. The 
largest bloc was the United Iraqi Alliance, formed by mostly Shia parties including the 
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, later known as the Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq, and the Da’wah party. 178 The UIA slate included 15 supporters of 
Muqtada al-Sadr despite his criticism of the U.S. initiated process, and eight of them won 
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seats.179 The Kurdistan Alliance, a coalition of the two major Kurdish parties, came in 
second, followed by the Iraqi List, a secular group led by interim prime minister Iyad 
Allawi.180 
The January 2005 election to the Transitional National Assembly was 
consequently characterized by voting along ethnic lines and support for parties organized 
by sect. In effect, the legislature was constituted much like the CPA and IGC. According 
to some observers, the political lines established by the CPA and IGC were furthered by 
the national nature of the elections and absence of district divisions. The elections then 
“became almost purely a national-identity referendum, untempered by any local 
component or flavor.”181 While the system avoided many of the complications associated 
with the drawing of districts, it also served to incentivize support for the most widely-
known candidates. The elites who were best at mobilizing voters generally did so through 
appeals to sect or ethnicity.  
Although the election winners were almost exclusively Shia or Kurd, the post-
election political process was not without struggle among competing parties and interests. 
The United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdistan Alliance aligned shortly after the elections. It 
took two months, however, for the different factions within the UIA to agree to a 
government and then another month for them to gain parliamentary approval. During this 
time the Constituent Assembly elected Jalal Talabani as president, promoting him to a 
position in the Iraq government never before filled by a Kurd.182 Da’wa leader Ibrahim 
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al-Jafari was elected Prime Minister, and Adel Abd al-Mahdi of SCIRI became second 
deputy president.183 Despite continued infighting, the Shia and Kurds political groups 
were in a position to greatly affect the content of the new constitution. 
The Sunnis realized soon after the April 2005 formation of the transitional 
government that their decision to boycott the elections prevented any chance of lobbying 
for their interests during the constitution-writing process and thus threatened their 
position in the new democracy. Consequently, they demanded to be included in the 
constitution-drafting committee. With the help of the Americans, who realized Sunni 
participation was vital to the security and stability of the government, the 55-member 
drafting committee added 15 voting and 10 nonvoting Sunni delegates.184 Though this 
movement was far from Sunni acceptance of the American-led and Shia-dominated 
democratic process, it indicated that there was some recognition on the part of Sunni 
leaders that the rules-based system offered potential rewards for participation. 
Constitutional deliberations soon took center stage. Despite their inclusion, the 
Sunnis remained apprehensive of what they saw as an overtly federal document. In their 
view, such a constitution might lead to the formation of a Kurdish northern region and 
Shia southern region, both with the majority of Iraq’s natural resources.185 While the Shia 
and Kurds were satisfied with the institutionalization of a weak and thus less threatening 
central government, “most Sunni Arab political leaders condemned the document, 
contending that its provisions for a federal system with strong provincial and regional 
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governments would lead to Iraq’s disintegration.”186 The issue of federalism also led to 
conflict among Shia parties, as each sought to gain control over what they saw as the 
inevitable formation of an independent and oil-rich Shia region.187  
While maintaining the largely federal nature of the constitution, the Shia and 
Kurdish members reluctantly agreed to the addition of an article that called for a new 
debate over constitutional amendments after the general elections. This fulfilled a major 
demand of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni bloc, and as a result it requested its 
followers vote for constitutional approval. Even so, the constitution faced stiff Sunni 
opposition, with three Sunni provinces casting negative votes. One of these Sunni 
provinces registered 55 percent negative votes rather than the two-thirds required, 
however, and the approval of Shia and Kurdish provinces ensured the constitution was 
approved.188 
The Transitional National Assembly decided to adopt a two-tiered proportional 
representation system, one similar to that recommended by Iraqi and international 
advisors, for the December 2005 National Assembly election. 230 of 275 seats were 
allocated to the provinces as multimember districts, and the remaining 45 were filled 
from national lists, a system that ensured proportionality.189 This procedure, along with 
the decision by the Sunni leadership to participate, ensured that the community would be 
represented in the National Assembly. Around 7,500 candidates participated in the 
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elections, organized into coalitions of political parties, separate political parties, and 
individuals.190 
12 million Iraqis, or 77 percent of the voting population, took part in the 
December elections.191 Five coalitions dominated the contests and were rewarded with 
the majority of seats in the Assembly. These coalitions were the UIA, including a group 
of al-Sadr’s followers, the Kurdistan Alliance, the Iraqi National List, and two Sunni 
alliances, the Iraqi Accord Front and the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue.192 Though the 
legislature was sufficiently representative of the major sectarian and ethnic groupings 
within Iraq, the absence of parties that cut across identity lines or emphasized the larger 
Iraqi national identity indicated a continuance of the politics first evident in the creation 
of the IGC. The election confirmed ethnonational identity as the major determinant of 
political identity, and made it difficult for secular parties based on Iraqi unity to compete. 
The victory of political parties organized largely on the basis of identity was 
unchallenged even with the change in electoral system. As Adeed Dawisha and Diamond 
write, “…when the underlying pressures and constraints are powerful and entrenched, a 
change in the electoral system may in the near term do little to transcend them.”193 Most 
parties in place for the 2005 elections had come to recognize that appeals to ethnicity and 
religious sect were both expected and instrumental for mobilizing support. Dawisha and 
Diamond continue:  
In their entrenchment of ethnic and sectarian fissures as the main organizing 
principle of politics, the three votes highlighted the role and limits of electoral-
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system design in the quest to manage and contain potentially polarizing 
divisions.194 
  
Political competition among Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds was of course to some extent a 
product of the communal tensions already evident at Iraq’s creation and intensified under 
Saddam. The transition and early democratic institutions, however, had done little to this 
point to ameliorate such sectarian conflict. 
The elections and formation of the National Assembly were not accompanied by 
any resolution of conflict. Violence increased greatly over this period, and by late 2006, 
the UN reported that nearly 3,000 people were killed every month in sectarian clashes.195 
From March 2006 to March 2007, civilian deaths numbered 26,540 by conservative 
estimates, making it the most violent twelve month period since 2003.196 While the 
violence in 2004 was largely on the part of Sunni insurgents wishing to force out the 
United States and in protest of their loss of power, the increase in conflict in 2006 was 
due to the rise of Shia militias in defense of the continued Sunni threats.197 
The violence was arguably attributable to more than simple sectarian divisions 
and jealousies. Penny Green and Tony Ward, for example, argue that the removal of 
Saddam and his repressive and authoritarian state apparatus provided increased 
opportunity for criminals to act. While much violence was politically motivated, it is just 
as likely that some acts labeled political or sectarian were actually on the part of Iraqis 
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criminals seeking to take advantage of a less secure situation.198 Paul R. Williams  and 
Tony Ward similarly argue that the absence of institutionalized security forces and 
inability of the national government to control the situation led to increased divisions in 
Iraqi society, “as Iraqis starving for protection turn[ed] to the only organizations that 
appear to offer it: groups organized along ethno-sectarian lines.”199 The formation of 
politics according to ethnic and sectarian identity was furthered by a security situation 
that encouraged adherence to one’s most closely related groups. 
 Though important developments had taken place, including democratic elections 
as touted by the Bush administration and other international observers, the increased 
violence threatened political gains and made the few compromises accomplished between 
sectarian groups tenuous. President Bush reasoned that increased security in Baghdad, the 
center of the violence, was necessary for continued democratic progress. Consequently, 
he ordered more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq in 2007, a decision 
known as “the surge.” Military officials advised that increased troop levels would allow 
American and Iraqi forces to secure gains made in neighborhoods once insurgents had 
been removed.200 Decreased violence, it was supposed, would assist in improvements in 
governance and the economy. 
 The surge was successful in reducing violence and improving security as higher 
troop levels were able to establish and maintain control over larger areas. As Gause 
                                                 
198
 Penny Green and Tony Ward, “The Transformation of Violence in Iraq,” British Journal of Criminology 
49.5 (2009): 1. 
199
 Paul R. Williams and Matthew T. Simpson, “Rethinking the Political Future: An Alternative to the 
Ethno-Sectarian Division of Iraq,” American University International Law Review 24.2 (2008): 206. 
200
 Darin E.W. Johnson, “2007 in Iraq: The Surge and Benchmarks – A New Way Forward?,” American 
University International Law Review 24.2 (2008): 252.  
 80 
argues, however, “Equally important to the improved security situation was the revolt 
among many Sunni Arabs against the excesses of al-Qaeda in Iraq and its Islamic State of 
Iraq.”201 Additionally, the U.S. decided during this time to increase support of Sunni 
groups opposed to al-Qaeda. These “Awakening Councils,” composed of Sunni tribal 
elements, engaged in parliamentary campaigns against al-Qaeda and were funded by the 
US. It could also be argued that once diverse neighborhoods had effectively been 
homogenized through a process of ethnic and sectarian cleansing, limiting potential 
sources of conflict.202 
Regardless of its causes, the decrease in violence allowed important political 
progress as pointed to by Williams and Simpson. In February 2008, the Assembly was 
able to compromise across party lines to pass the Provincial Powers Law, Amnesty Law, 
and 2008 Budget, all of which reflected different and at times competing interests. While 
the Kurds emphasized the budget and its provisions for revenue distribution, the Sunnis 
advocated amnesty and the Shia provincial powers.  The fact that the legislature was able 
pass all three was, in the view of Williams and Simpson, an important step forward in the 
democratic process.203 Another settlement was reached on September 24, 2008, when the 
Assembly ruled that provincial elections in Kirkuk would be held at a later date and 
under a different set of rules. Though these deliberations delayed the provincial elections 
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originally scheduled for October 1, 2008, the decision was a compromise between 
Kurdish and Arab political interests.204   
 Provincial elections were held on January 31, 2009, and voters filled 440 seats in 
14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces. Unlike elections in 2005, the 2009 elections implemented an 
open list proportional representation system. This required Iraqis to vote for both a party 
and individuals within the party. Provincial councils were organized according to the 
percentage of votes gained by each party, with positions within the councils awarded to 
individuals according to their electoral performances.205 Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law 
coalition increased its standing in the government, winning approximately 20 percent of 
the vote in southern provinces. Most of the other votes were spread across smaller parties, 
and ISCI lost much of the power it had in previous governments.206 Interestingly, 80 
percent of the political parties that competed for seats had formed after the 2005 
elections, showing both wider participation and divisions within the major parties.207  
 Iraqi democracy was at a crossroads in the lead up to the 2010 National Assembly 
elections. It had succeeded in creating a constitution that institutionalized representative 
processes and adherence to the rule of law, and multiple votes with high turnouts and 
legitimate results had established a functioning legislature, prime minister and president, 
and provincial councils. Additionally, increased troop levels and a greater focus on 
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counterinsurgency allowed important security improvements and gave the new 
institutions room to operate and make important future decisions. 
 Serious challenges remained, however. The political system was based largely on 
ethnic and sectarian divisions, and there was no guarantee that conflict among 
communities would subside as competition for political power and control over resources 
intensified. Though these difficulties are in many ways characteristic of a democratic 
transition in a divided state, Iraq faced the additional problem of democracy imposed 
externally. As Diamond writes:  
…the coalition never realized that, although most Iraqis were deeply grateful to 
have been liberated from a brutal tyranny, this gratitude was mixed with deep 
suspicion of the real motives of the United States […]; humiliation that it was not 
Iraqis themselves who had overthrown Saddam; and high, indeed unrealistic, 
expectations for the post-war administration, which they assumed could deliver 
them rapidly from all their problems.208 
 
Mistakes made by the United States and the challenge of authenticity for a system created 
largely by outsiders negatively affected an already difficult transition.  
The question of legitimacy was a major one going forward, both in the continued 
involvement of the United States and the major political and economic questions 
requiring compromise among competing interests and identities. There were indications, 
however, that Iraq’s major political actors had reluctantly agreed to participate in 
democracy, if only to secure goods for their own communities. None of Iraq’s ethnic or 
sectarian groups was attempting to break away from the state or to gain autonomy beyond 
the federalism offered by the constitution. Rather, conflict was mostly over control of the 
state in a political system that allowed for new competition and power relationships. 
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Continued ethno-sectarian conflict was not inevitable, but debate over the future role of 
the United States and the upcoming political contests were likely to test the new 
government and its status for the Iraqi people. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 84 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE KURDISH ISSUE 
The status of the Kurds of Iraq is an additional problem facing this country. The 
future of democracy in Iraq is tied to a resolution of this issue. Their sense of security and 
continued participation within the democratic system will further legitimize the Iraqi 
state, especially given their historic status as a nation spread among multiple countries 
with aspirations of independence. Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson summarize the 
importance of the current relationship between the central government and the Kurdish 
region:  
Put simply, if the management of this division is successful and results in a 
durable set of political compromises, then Iraq will survive and may even evolve 
into a sustainable democracy. If, however, the divide worsens, or if there is an 
attempt by Baghdad to impose a ‘solution’ on Erbil – which would then be 
followed by a violent reaction – then the fragile political consensus that underpins 
Iraq’s nascent political order will unravel in short order, and the very territorial 
integrity of Iraq will be threatened.209  
 
A failure to incorporate the Kurds in the Iraqi democratic system threatens the legitimacy 
of the government and endangers Kurdistan’s existence in Iraq, a scenario that would 
likely lead to tensions across the region. 
 As referenced in the previous chapter, the modern Iraqi government played a 
major role in shaping identity and thus political and social relationships. This naturally 
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affected the Kurds, particularly in their position as an ethnic minority in a state that rarely 
encouraged unifying and civic conceptions of belonging. According to Denise Natali:  
it was the drive of the Iraqi elites to construct an ethnicized, secular-based 
nationalism within a highly centralized political system that ultimately prevented 
ethnic reshaping in Iraq. While opportunities for reshaping existed, the state elites 
failed to instill a normative sense of ‘Iraqiness’ among Kurdish communities.210  
 
The ramifications of this history are evident today in the Kurds’ status as an autonomous 
community that in many aspects wishes to remain distinct from the rest of the Iraqi state. 
 Despite this legacy, it is possible to argue that for now the Kurds have accepted 
their place within Iraq and and are not acting to create an independent state. This view is 
bolstered by the unlikelihood that other states with Kurdish populations or the 
international community at large would support the creation of an independent territory 
based on Kurdish nationalism. According to Michael M. Gunter, Kurds in Iraq adopted 
the slogan “Democracy for Iraq, autonomy for Kurdistan,”211 during the 20th century in 
response to this realization. Still, the place of the Kurds within the newly democratic Iraq 
remains an important question and one that will affect the stability of the state and the 
functioning of its political system for years to come. 
 The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, although the community also 
comprises a number of Shia, Christian, and other sects. They share a common history, 
language, and culture, and have historically considered Kurdistan their homeland. Such 
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facts have led to “their being both self- and other-defined as a nation.”212 As an ideology, 
Kurdish nationalism developed in the mid to late 19th century under the influence of 
rising Arab and Turkish nationalism among each respective community’s intellectuals. 
According to Hashem Ahmadzadeh, it is unlikely the term “Kurd” was used by members 
of the group before this period; “rather, it seems likely that it was an ‘outsider’s term’ 
used by Arabs and Persians, with indigenous names being of tribal or geographic 
origin.”213  
 Despite the spread of nationalist ideas, Kurds were unable to attain their goal of 
an independent homeland after the end of the Ottoman Empire. In the new nation-state 
system that emerged after World War I, the Kurdish population was spread over multiple 
states. Ahmadzadeh argues that this failure can largely be attributed to the fact that 
“Kurdistan and the Kurds were divided by European imperial actions, and then targeted 
by the dominant nations in the countries they eventually found themselves in.”214 The 
Kurds’ division among five states, including Iraq, “burdened the Kurds with a structural 
weakness when it came to promoting an ethnic (i.e. pan-) Kurdistani agenda.”215 As a 
consequence, the Kurds have sought integration and protection within the states they 
reside while retaining the identity that bonds their community across state boundaries. 
Today Iraqi Kurds number 3.4 million and form 20 to 23% of the population. 
They live primarily in northern Iraq, bordered by Iran to the east, Turkey to the north, and 
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Syria to the west. Politically, the Kurds are largely divided into two factions: the Kurdish 
Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani, whose father founded the party in 1946, and 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, created in 1975 under Jalal Talabani. According to 
Gunter, “Divided by philosophy, dialect, geography, and ultimately ambition, Barzani’s 
KDP and Talabani’s PUK have alternated between cooperation and bloody conflict.”216 
Despite many shared goals, the two groups have often disagreed, a reality that is 
becoming more evident as they gain and compete for power in the Iraqi democracy.  
The history of the Iraqi Kurds is characterized by the government’s halfhearted 
attempts at integration and a struggle by the center to control the Kurdish periphery. 
Under British management, the provisional constitution of 1921 attempted to formalize 
equality of all Iraq’s constituent groups. This was accomplished through statements 
acknowledging Arab and Kurdish ethnicity within the Iraqi state and equality between the 
Kurdish and Arabic languages. In reality, however, the British generally favored 
landowning Arabs, and “the large cultural and political opportunities promised to Kurds 
were limited in time and unevenly implemented, which heightened the ethnic and socio-
economic dichotomies in Iraqi and Kurdish society.”217 Some Kurdish landowners 
benefited, but the peasant majority was largely ignored.  
Throughout the 1920s, the Kurds struggled against the prospect of being 
controlled by an Arab government. As Denise Natali writes, “Kurds not only lost their 
own bid for statehood, but were placed in a new context where their former Muslim 
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counterparts were now their overlords.”218 The British responded to such sentiments by 
attempting to satisfy the most powerful Kurdish groups, particularly the tribal and 
landowning classes. This complemented their strategy of ensuring cooperation with 
Iraq’s other groups, and resulted in pledges of allegiance to the government among some 
Kurds.219 The majority, however, remained uninvolved with the state-building project 
and were dissatisfied with their diminished role relative to Iraq’s Arabs. 
In the lead up to Iraqi independence, the Kurds became increasingly wary of 
growing Arab nationalism and Great Britain’s response to it. For example, the Anglo-
Iraqi Treaty of 1930 signed by Great Britain and the mandate government in Iraq did not 
acknowledge the Kurds or the rights of Iraq’s minorities. There was a growing gap 
between the educational and economic opportunities of Arabs and Kurds, and 
governmental power was increasingly tilted in the Arab’s favor. As Natali notes, from 
1920 to 1936 only four out of 57 cabinet ministers were Kurds.220 Consequently, the 
Kurds had little say in the state’s future and their place in it, leading them to depend on 
their own communal leaders and institutions for stability and support. 
Iraq became an independent state in 1932 and was accepted into the League of 
Nations with the requirement that it accept “international obligations to protect the civil 
and political rights of the Kurds and their rights as a minority group.”221 This 
pronouncement as well as subsequent legislation involving language rights and other 
provisions lead some to argue that “in strictly legal terms, Kurds have enjoyed more 
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national rights in Iraq than in any other host country.”222 Similarly, according to Reidar 
Visser, “Iraq was the first state with a significant Kurdish population to address the 
Kurdish issue in a comparatively non-paranoid fashion.”223 From Iraq’s creation, then, 
there was at the least an acknowledgement by the British and Iraqi elite that the Kurds 
formed an important part of the new state and that their demands required attention. 
 The reality of the Kurds’ integration into Iraq is questionable, however, as the 
government did not accompany proclamations of equality and inclusivity with concrete 
steps toward these goals. For example, following independence, King Faisal did not 
uphold the protections promised by Great Britain, and “key legislation…was 
implemented half-heartedly or not at all.”224 Carole A. O’Leary goes so far as to assert, 
“Since the creation of the modern state of Iraq, the history of Iraqi Kurdistan has been 
one of underdevelopment, political and cultural repression, destruction, ethnic cleansing, 
and genocide.”225 As the central state gained power, it became obvious to many Kurds 
that to gain influence or a measure of autonomy for their community required a 
commitment to the vision of Baghdad and thus of the Sunni Arab elites who dominated 
the state.  
 Subsequent regimes showed some promise of better relations between the center 
and the Kurds. Under Bakr Sidqi, from 1936 to 1937, there was greater recognition of 
both the Kurds and Shia and their contribution to the Iraqi heritage. Abd al-Karim 
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Qassem, prime minister from 1958 to 1963, continued this trend and included both 
groups in his government, establishing a provisional constitution that professed Iraq’s 
Arab and Kurd nations. As a result, “major political dividing lines were reorganized on 
ideological principles transcending communal boundaries.”226 Kurds enjoyed greater 
educational opportunities, government participation, and cultural recognition during this 
time. 
 The rise of Arab nationalism proved a powerful force, one that Iraq’s leaders 
could not ignore and negatively affected their dealings with the Kurdish community. As 
Natali writes, “Under Arab nationalist influences Kurdish-state relations spiralled 
downward.”227 Qassem, for example, divided Kurdish organizations, including the KDP, 
and arrested leading Kurdish nationalists. The Kurds lost much of their political power as 
a result of the growth of pan-Arabism. During the monarchy, Kurds formed 15% of the 
higher ranks of the administration and 25% of the lower ranks. By the 1960s, the rise of 
Arab nationalism, Kurds held only 2% of the positions in the higher tiers and 13% in the 
lower.228 Sunni Arabs became dominant in the army and government positions while both 
Kurds and Shia were increasingly marginalized. 
 The 1958 revolution was met with new hopes for Kurdish integration and genuine 
cooperation between the Kurds and Arabs. Kurdish leaders, including Barzani, were 
freed, and Khalid Naqshabandi, a Kurd, was included in the three-man sovereignty 
council. The rise of the Baath Party led to hopes of an accommodating central 
government that would allow for some measure of Kurdish autonomy. Both hopes proved 
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futile. After the revolution, the Arab nationalist Free Officers strengthened their hold over 
the Kurds. Later, talks with the Baath government on possible autonomy went sour over 
the Kurdish desire to include Kirkuk and Mosul. The Baathists militarized their 
oppression of the Kurds and began a process of Arabization by which they denied a 
distinct Kurdish identity and encouraged Arabs to move to the north of the country.229  
 Saddam’s rise to power allowed some openings for Kurds and Shias who were 
especially loyal to the Baathist regime. During the early Baath years, the government 
offered the Kurds an agreement known as the March Manifesto in an attempt to 
“consolidate [its]…grip on civil, political, and military power within the nation.”230 In the 
Manifesto’s final form, negotiated between Saddam Hussein and Mahmud Uthman on 
behalf of the KDP in 1970, many of the Kurds’ demands were met. It guaranteed Kurdish 
participation in the government as well as senior positions, ensured that one of Iraq’s vice 
presidents would be Kurdish and that all officials in Kurdistan would be Kurd or speak 
Kurdish, and designated funds to develop Kurdistan.231  
 In 1974, Saddam Hussein offered the Law for Autonomy in the Area of Kurdistan 
to Barzani in another attempt at cooperation between the two groups. This law 
established Kurdistan as self-governing, but did not include Kirkuk and “imposed a 
vastly more central government control over the region than was envisaged by the March 
Manifesto.”232 Barzani did not accept the offer, and neither this law nor the Manifesto 
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came to fruition. For the Kurds, this was yet another example of the central state’s 
unfulfilled promises and lack of understanding of Kurdish aims. 
Natali summarizes the relationship between the Iraqi central government and 
Kurds throughout this period:  
By 1970 the pattern of reshaping behavior had become clear. After regime 
changes or when government power is threatened, the state elites attempt to 
reshape to consolidate their power-base. But given the domination of conservative 
Arab nationalist, and military factions in the government, the elites are unable or 
unwilling to cross the threshold of granting the Kurds political equality. 
Reshaping is not real but simply a time-gaining tactic used by Iraqi officials.233  
 
The regime cooperated with and gave concessions to the Kurds when politically 
expedient, but easily dismissed Kurdish demands when it did not need their support. It is 
interesting to speculate whether this pattern continues to affect the Kurds’ perception of 
their role in the government today and if their fear of being taken advantage of by the 
central state leads them to be more emphatic in their demands.  
 The central government was able to increase its control over all of Iraq’s 
communities by taking advantage of Iraq’s increasing oil wealth. According to Natali, 
“The petrol economy created new incentive structures for the state elites to co-opt and 
control Kurdish groups.”234 This included increasing the Arab populations of Kirkuk and 
other regions with significant oil reserves. The Baath party also tightened its grip on the 
state to the extent that Iraqi citizenship required loyalty to and membership in its ranks.235 
This was exemplified by a law in 1986 in which anyone who ran for election to the 
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Legislative Council, an elected body within Kurdistan, had to be approved by the central 
government and believe in and promote the principles of the party.236  
 The beginning of the Iran-Iraq war was characterized by a slight improvement in 
Kurdish-Arab relations, largely because the government wished to temper any domestic 
issues that would hurt their efforts in combat. As the war reached its conclusions, 
however, “the diminishing military threat from Iran freed the government to concentrate 
additional forces against the Kurds.”237 This was in response to Kurdish nationalists’ 
support of Iran and their increased control over northern regions as the central 
government was concentrated on its military efforts. The result was increased torture, 
relocation, and indiscriminate detention imposed on the Kurds by the central government. 
 Arguably the worst devastation experienced by Iraq’s Kurds took place in 1988 
and is known as Al-Anfal. During this campaign, Ali Hasan al-Majid, Saddam’s cousin, 
undertook mass executions in Kurdish villages, destroying 90% of them and at least 20 
small towns. Writes O’Leary, “The operation was carefully planned and included 
identifying villages in rebel held areas, declaring these villages and surrounding areas 
‘prohibited’ and authorizing the killing of any person or animal found in these areas.”238 
Human Rights Watch concluded the event was a crime of genocide and made special note 
of the regime’s use of chemical weapons against the town of Halabja and other Kurdish 
villages.239 The extreme degree of violence has been a stain on Kurdish-Arab relations 
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since, and confirms for many Kurds their perception of a history of persecution and 
violence suffered under the Iraqi state.  
 In defense, Saddam argued Al-Anfal was part of an operation against traitors of 
the state and the Kurds’ desire to gain autonomy. The attack was also intended as revenge 
for the Kurds’ support, whether real or perceived, of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.240 In 
1986, the Iranian government brokered a truce between the PUK and KDP, leading 
Saddam to fear an alliance between Kurdistan and Iran.241 Given the scale of death and 
destruction during the eight year war, it was not difficult for Saddam to convince many 
Iraqis that his actions were necessary to secure the country from further incursions. 
Saddam’s rhetoric also gave weight to the view that the Kurds were outsiders and not full 
and authentic members of the Iraqi state. 
 The Kurds became involved in the revolt against the Iraqi government in the 
spring of 1991. Many of those who participated believed the U.S. under President George 
Bush was going to support the uprising, and were greatly disappointed when he did not 
supply them with arms. This belief originated with Bush’s suggestion that the Iraqi 
people “take matters into their own hands” and force Saddam out of power. Similar 
statements were broadcast to the Iraqis on the Voice of American station. Regardless of 
the catalyst, Saddam put down the uprising easily and used ground troops and helicopter 
gunships to regain the north. At least 20,000 Kurds died in the crackdown, and millions 
of refugees fled to Turkey and Iran.242  
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 In response, the United Nations Security Council created a Kurdish safe haven 
and northern no-fly zone through Resolution 688. This region was 40,000 square 
kilometers in area, about half the size of Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraq withdrew its government 
from the safe haven in October 1991, allowing the Kurds there a measure of self-
governance under the new Kurdistan Regional Government. Elections to the Kurdistan 
National Assembly took place in May 1992, resulting in a power sharing agreement 
between the KDP and PUK.243 The Kurds within the area consequently gained experience 
in the processes of democracy and participation in a representative government, a 
familiarity that many observers have argued affects their involvement in Iraqi democracy 
today. 
 The failure of the uprising and subsequent creation of the safe haven by the U.N. 
were major developments in the Kurds’ relationship with the central government. In 
many ways, the uprising was a continuance of the struggle by Iraqi Kurds to make their 
demands known to the increasingly powerful central state. Saddam’s violent reaction then 
cemented the Kurdish perception of their inferior status within Iraq. The creation of an 
autonomous region for the Kurds was in many ways necessary given the brutality they 
experienced at the regime’s hands, but it furthered the Kurd’s experience of being 
separate from the Arabs and thus separate from the state. Maintenance of this level of 
self-rule has become a nonnegotiable for Kurds in democratic Iraq, a stipulation that 
some believe threatens the state’s unity. 
 As a fairly autonomous area under the protection of the United Nations, the 
Kurdish haven was able to avoid many of the effects of sanctions that were so detrimental 
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to the rest of the country. The opportunities provided by this shield did not influence all 
residents of the area equally, however. Thabit Abdullah writes:  
The relative safety created the basis for a more stable economy, but its uncertain 
future, fear of Turkish intentions, and the continuous rivalry between the KDP 
and PUK also gave rise to smuggling and profiteering, with the two Kurdish 
parties making the most of this parallel economy.244  
 
Kurdish autonomy was not without its challenges, and failed to satisfy many of the 
expectations of the population. Still, it was an important development, and one that has 
greatly affected their place in Iraqi democracy. 
 Two years after the creation of the KRG the arrangement between KDP and PUK 
broke down and was accompanied by serious clashes between the parties. According to 
Gunter:  
Ultimately, their conflict derived from the old struggle for power between the 
more conservative, nationalist KDP, associated with the Kurmanji or Bahdinani 
speaking areas in the mountainous northwest of northern Iraq, and the most leftist, 
socialist PUK, largely based in the Sorani speaking areas of Sulaymaniya in the 
southeast.245  
 
They also conflicted over each other’s relations with Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. While the 
U.S. helped to broker a peace deal and division of power in 1998, the PUK and KDP 
remain somewhat antagonist actors as they continue to compete for power.  
 Despite the violence of the 1980s and 1991, the Kurds were arguably still 
committed to their existence in Iraq. It is true more Kurds during this time demanded 
federalism as a way to gain power beyond that offered by autonomy, yet “it cannot be 
emphasized enough that Kurdish demands at this point did not envisage the obliteration 
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of Baghdad as a center of government.”246 As Gunter writes, “Despite the abject failure 
of Iraqi nationalism to satisfy and encompass Kurdish nationalism,” both parties 
remained loyal to Iraq. Barzani declared “our [the Kurdish] goal is not to set up an 
independent state,” while Talibani stated, “We do not want to break away from Iraq; we 
want a democratic Iraq.”247  Thus, Iraqi Kurds focused on their status within the state 
rather than a wider, shared identity with their Kurdish brethren in other countries. 
 The condition of the Kurds in Iraq prior to the American invasion, then, was one 
of separation and resentment. In 2002 and 2003, the Kurds and other opposition groups 
within Iraq felt increasingly certain that the Bush administration was preparing to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein. Seeking to gain power and decision-making capabilities in 
the aftermath, the groups met in February 2003 in the Kurdish safe haven to form a 
preparatory committee for the post-Saddam transition.248 Unsurprisingly, the Kurds were 
supportive of the U.S. campaign and played a central role from the beginning of the 
democratic project. As the Coalition Provisional Authority and other early decision-
making bodies included limited Sunni participation, the Kurds and Shia were empowered 
and allowed to voice their interests to an extent they had never experienced before. 
Going forward in the transition, the political alliance between the Kurdish bloc 
and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq was instrumental in the passage of the 
constitution by referendum in January 2005 and the composition of the Council of 
Representatives. The Iraqi Governing Council included Barzani and Talabani as well as 
three other, independent Kurdish leaders, and a top Barzani aide, Hoshyar Zebari, was 
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foreign minister in the cabinet appointed by the IGC. The interim government was 
similarly organized, with Zabari acting as foreign minister and Talabani aide Barham 
Salih as deputy Prime Minister. In addition to their political participation, the 75,000 
strong peshmerga Kurdish militia was “the most pro-U.S. force in Iraq” during this time 
and thus played an important role in the growing security services.249  
 According to Kenneth Katzman and Alfred B. Prados, “The high level Kurdish 
participation marked the first time in Iraq’s history that the Kurds had entered national 
politics on an equal footing with Iraq’s Arab majority.”250 This development naturally 
legitimized democracy in Kurdish eyes, despite the uncertainty over the shape of the 
government and the level of participation by Iraq’s other groups. The Kurds’ major 
demands following Saddam’s removal were:  
…autonomy bordering on outright independence, the expansion of their 
autonomous region to include Kirkuk and parts of the province of Mosul, and a 
weak central government in Baghdad to ensure that their gains will not be 
overturned.251 
  
They took full advantage of their ascendant position under a U.S. fostered democratic 
process to ensure that these demands were heard and met as fully as possible.  
 The Kurds’ bargaining position was compounded by the Sunni boycott. Their 
willingness and ability to participate in the new government and thus to influence policy 
in the early stages allowed them to include what is known as the “Kurdish veto” in the 
constitution. This affirms that constitutional revisions may be rejected by a two-thirds 
majority vote in three or more provinces, ensuring that the Kurdish regions can halt 
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amendments they see as harmful to their interests. The constitution is also inherently 
federal in that it creates distinct regions with allocated governmental powers, a provision 
that can protect the Kurds from excesses or abuses on the part of the central 
government.252 
 Iraq’s Shia and Sunni communities were understandably anxious over the 
prospect of increased Kurdish autonomy embodied in a new constitution. In response, the 
Kurds argued “that the Kurdish preference for federalism was driven by security needs 
more than a desire to break away, and that federalism was the strongest guarantee that the 
country would remain united.”253 Though the inclusion of such provisions was necessary 
to gain Kurdish support, there is disagreement over whether the Kurd’s success in the 
constitution-building process has led to hesitation over its rightfulness among Iraq’s other 
constituencies. 
Consequently, some argue that the Kurds’ input to the constitution led to the 
creation of a document: 
…that reflects the political realities of the immediate post-invasion period, when 
those opposed to the furthering of Kurdish autonomy or the federalization of Iraq 
– namely Sunnis and Shias not affiliated with ISCI – were excluded (or, more 
precisely, excluded themselves) from the constitution-writing process.254  
 
Democratic legitimacy requires buy-in by all the major state actors towards the 
constitution and the government structure it puts forward. If Iraq’s Sunnis and Shias feel 
the current document does not sufficiently protect their interests, conflict over any 
proposed changes will likely manifest. 
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 The debate over Kirkuk is exemplary of the larger tensions between the Kurds 
and the central Iraqi government. Kurds consider the region part of Kurdistan, albeit one 
that was “Turkified during the Ottoman Empire and Arabized by every government since 
the inception of the state.”255 Today, Kirkuk’s population includes Kurds as well as 
Arabs, Turkmens, and Christians. Kirkuk is located next to Iraq’s second largest oil field, 
which holds one-fifth of the country’s reserves, increasing its strategic value.256 The 
region is of great economic and symbolic significance to both Erbil and Baghdad as they 
attempt to come to an agreement on the shape of Kurdish federalism. 
 In line with Kurdish demands, the Transitional Administrative Law of 2004 
stipulated three stages in the determination of Kirkuk’s status in the newly democratic 
Iraq. These included normalization, or a reversal of Arabization, a census, and a 
referendum. The constitution’s Article 140 incorporated this outline, and were it to be 
implemented, it is likely the referendum would lead to Kirkuk’s inclusion in Kurdistan. 
The support of Kirkuk’s other minorities for this policy is questionable, however, and the 
geographic segmentation of its Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen communities further 
complicates any other initiative of the Kurdish leadership.257  
 Furthermore, Turkey is firmly opposed to Article 140 or other attempts to include 
Kirkuk in Kurdistan, as its leaders believe such a determination would empower Iraqi 
Kurds to the point of declaring their independence.258 This would likely incite Turkey’s 
own restive Kurdish population. Regional tensions are already high given the 
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assertiveness of Iraqi Kurds and their strengthened position in the state. Turkey, Iran, and 
Syria view the possibility of more boldness by the Kurds of Iraq as threatening to the 
stability of their own Kurdish regions in its potential spillover effects.  
 The debate over federalism and the Kurds’ rightful place in Iraq has been shifted 
by a change in the demographics of Kurdistan. Many Arabs living within the boundaries 
of Kurdistan were relocated there as part of the Saddam’s forced Arabization campaign, 
leading many Kurds to perceive them as outsiders. This transference has accelerated 
since 2003, as nearly 20,000 Arabs have moved north to seek jobs in Kurdistan’s stronger 
economy.259 It is more difficult to argue for autonomy on the basis of Kurdish identity 
and guarantees of cultural and language rights when the ethnic makeup of the region is 
increasingly mixed. This affects subsequent Kurdish demands, because Kurdistan’s 
leaders must attempt to pacify both the Kurdish and non-Kurdish populations. 
 The reality of the KDP and PUK’s participation in the Iraqi government has led 
them to expand their bases of support by tailoring their platforms to include the non-
Kurdish populations in Kurdistan. Neither Talabani nor Barzani will risk his position in 
the government by raising the issue of secession, and any talk of Kurdish-nationalism is 
avoided in the interests of relations with Turkey and other neighboring states. This stance 
may become problematic for the current Iraqi Kurdish leaders, for:  
…it is exactly these sorts of ideas that the active political classes in Iraqi 
Kurdistan now wish to hear, and this is one of the main reasons (along with the 
issue of corruption) why the leadership of the KDP and PUK is routinely and 
powerfully criticized.260 
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Participation in a democracy requires Kurdish leaders to seek to meet the demands of all 
those living in Kurdistan, but may endanger their support among a Kurdish population 
who sees them as too yielding in their platforms. 
 Most recently is the controversy posed by current Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. 
Maliki is often described as a centrist, and has been publicly critical of federalism in Iraq 
since 2005. He was also supported by the Sadrists in 2006, a group that has been 
particularly vocal in their opposition to the Kurdish demand for Kirkuk. According to 
Visser, Maliki stated in November 2007 that “decentralization should not come at the 
expense of the governance capabilities of the capital.”261 Whether Maliki’s concern over 
federalism is related to its potential effects on state stability or his own efforts to amass 
power at the center is uncertain. His position in Iraqi politics, however, ensures his views 
will be taken seriously by Kurds and non-Kurds. 
 The question of federalism has also led Maliki and the leaders of Kurdistan to 
spar over foreign oil investments. Kurdistan, under the KRG, has signed almost 50 oil 
and gas deals with international oil companies. However, the central government has 
claimed that it considers any such deals with the KRG as invalid, though the KRG asserts 
that they are acting within the constitution. Most recently, a member of the Iraqi 
Department for Energy stated that Exxon Mobil would be excluded from the state’s 
upcoming licensing auction because it had struck a deal with the KRG. Much of this 
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conflict might stem from a claim by both the KRG and the central government for oil-
rich territory that was included in the KRG-Exxon deal.262  
Given these tensions, some Iraqis argue that it may be time to reassess the 
constitution and its emphasis on regionalism and devolution. In their view, such a 
discussion will “return Iraq to what is perceived to be its ‘natural’ state, a unitary entity 
focused on Baghdad with key competences all under the control of a centralized state.”263 
Though many Shia supported federalism during 2005 as a guard against the rise of a 
powerful Saddam-like leader, their current position in the state has changed their 
calculations. Conversely, Sunni leaders have historically favored a centralized state but 
now worry about the national government’s increasing authority under Maliki.264 
 Kurds also support the efforts of other provinces, such as Sunni-majority Diyala 
and Anbar, to gain autonomy. Maliki is staunchly opposed to this stance, as he sees such 
autonomy as a threat to the authority of the central government.265 It is difficult to assess 
how popular the Kurdish vision of increased autonomy for Iraq’s constituent groups is 
among other members of the population. According to Visser, since 2008 most of Iraq, 
besides Kurdistan, has been mostly satisfied with the federal government as operating 
from Baghdad.266 Similarly, as reported by The National Interest:  
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For Kurds, federalism has almost acquired the status of a religious belief system 
because it is tied to their century-old quest for their own state. But for many Iraqi 
Arabs, federalism is seen as synonymous with partition.267  
 
It is true many Iraqis want decentralization to the extent of greater authority over issues 
of local interest. Most, however, do not support Kurdistan-level autonomy. 
 The departure of American forces in late 2011 has of course forced new 
calculations for the Kurds, believed by many to be America’s strongest ally in the 
country. The new situation has worried the Kurds, for “among Iraqis, the Kurds benefited 
the most from the war, and now may have the most to lose if the political 
chaos…metastasizes into civil war.”268 In an interview with The New York Times, 
Barham A. Salih, prime minister of the Kurdish regional government admitted the 
community’s fear, saying, “Our national interest as Kurds lies in a democratic, federal, 
peaceful Iraq. We still have a long way to go before we get there.”269 Going forward, the 
Kurds are positioned between Sunni and Shia factions that are, for the moment, 
increasingly hostile toward each other. The best-case scenario for democracy in Iraq 
would be for the Kurdish political community to offer a bridge between the competing 
Arabs, stimulating the compromises needed for democracy.  
 Perhaps it is not that Iraqi Kurds do not want their own state, but that for the 
moment they see remaining part of Iraq with a measure of autonomy as their best option. 
They of course factor into such calculations the likelihood that a move toward 
independent statehood would aggravate Iran, Turkey, and Syria, possibly leading to 
regional conflict. According to Abdullah:  
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Ironically, Kurdish leaders who have long fought for autonomy and greater 
separation are today doing more to keep the country unified than any of the Arab 
leaders. There is a greater awareness in Kurdistan that the dismemberment of the 
country will surely result in Turkish and Iranian intervention, leading to the loss 
of even limited regional sovereignty.270  
 
The uncertainty that accompanies a failing Iraqi state leads many Kurdish leaders to 
support unity, to guarantee their own positions and the successes their community has 
achieved. 
 More fundamental is the remaining problem of the Kurds’ and other groups’ sense 
of belonging in the Iraqi state. According to Gunter:  
For democracy and federalism to work, all groups must recognize the legitimacy 
of the state, trust in one’s fellow citizens, and have faith in majority rule. Since 
there is no tradition of any of this in Iraq, the Kurdish future in post-Saddam Iraq 
remains problematic.271  
 
This issue is especially contentious for the Kurds, given their community’s long tradition 
as a minority making demands for independence. Henri J. Barkey and Ellen Laipson 
argue: “Should federalism be viewed over time as weakening the Iraqi state and unity of 
the country, the Kurds and their affective advocacy of their interests could well be held 
accountable.”272 Iraq’s Kurds must balance their desire for autonomy and recognition 
with participation and enrichment of the democratic process.  
 Iraqi Kurds’ desire for a weak national government that upholds their demands for 
power sharing measures and a federal structure with significant autonomy is based on 
their generally contentious history with the central state. There is a sense that Kurds will 
press for increased self-rule or threaten secession if Iraq’s democracy fails to guarantee 
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these demands or is seen as withholding too much power from provincial administrations. 
The prospects of independence, however, are questionable: geopolitical realities preempt 
Kurdish secessionism and potential benefits from Kurdistan’s oil wealth require major 
improvements in the region’s infrastructure. Arguably, the best option for the Kurds is 
that Iraqi democracy strengthens and so demands their continued participation and 
support. Improved and better functioning rules and institutions will further provide for 
the recognition of Kurdish demands while allowing cooperation between the Kurds and 
other political factions on matters that rightfully concern the entire state.    
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CHAPTER SIX: TOWARD CONSOLIDATION? 
Iraq’s experience with democracy has been mixed so far, as historical ethnic and 
social divisions have become salient and conflictual through the external introduction of a 
more open and competitive political system. The challenges faced by Iraq during its 
transition are in some ways characteristic of the general experience of countries with 
multiple ethnic and religious groups. However, Iraq is unique in many ways as well, 
given the unity displayed by its communities at various points in its history and the 
potential for their cooperation under more favorable economic and political 
circumstances. Iraq’s democratic experience is also influenced by the fact that the 
transition was initiated by an outside power, one that has played a heavy role in 
determining the shape of the system. The inability of the state to deal with competing 
political demands in a context of decreased security led to intersectarian conflict that 
continues to test the state today.  
However, it is possible democratic government has gained a degree of legitimacy 
among the Iraqi population and will offer a long-term solution to conflict management 
among Iraq’s communities. Democracy provides equality under the law and allows the 
articulation of all major interests. It addresses previously violent conflicts through 
political channels, and gives communities an opportunity to make their demands known 
through institutionalized methods of representation. Over time, it may promote a civic 
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identity that encompasses all ethnicities and religious sects. It is important then to explore 
how this occurs and if Iraq displays any evidence of such a development. 
Generally, democracies are more likely to endure when they experience a high 
level of legitimacy, or support from citizens of the state. According to Leonardo Morlino 
and Jose R. Montero, legitimacy “is a set of positive attitudes of a society toward its 
democratic institutions, which are considered as the most appropriate for of 
government.”273 New democracies may experience an initial increase in legitimacy 
simply because they offer change from the authoritarian regimes of the past. However, 
citizens may hold back their support for the new system because they are uncertain how it 
will affect them. It is also likely that in the beginning stages the rules of democracy are 
imperfect and incomplete, and thus unsuccessful in providing acceptable political 
outcomes. 
Legitimacy is separate from efficacy, or a political system’s effectiveness in 
accomplishing policy objectives. While efficacy is affected by a regime’s economic 
performance, legitimacy is tied more closely to citizens’ perceptions of the rightfulness of 
democracy as compared to other political systems. As Morlino and Montero note:  
…the correlations between preferences for democracy over authoritarianism 
(diffuse legitimacy) on the one hand, and satisfaction with the working of the 
respondent’s democratic regime (perceived efficacy), on the other, are rather 
low.274  
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Again, citizens may be attracted to democracy largely because it represents a break with 
the authoritarian regimes of the past. Such perceptions are unlikely to last, however, and 
democratic legitimacy consequently requires a basis in something besides its novelty. 
Though Iraq has had continuous democratic government since 2005, successive 
leaders and coalitions have largely failed to tackle the state’s most pressing problems. 
Many challenges related to economic and social infrastructure may be blamed on 
Saddam’s wars and the breakdown in state capacity following 2003, but the inability of 
democracy to adequately tackle joblessness, inequality, and corruption has frustrated 
most Iraqis. For example, unemployment is more than 15 percent, and 25 percent of the 
population lives under the poverty line. 40 percent of Iraqis are age 14 and under, 
resulting in a high influx of new laborers and further strains on the job market. The level 
of urbanization has reached 66 percent, placing increased demands on the state’s already 
burdened health and education facilities. Finally, Transparency International ranked Iraq 
the seventh most corrupt country in the world in 2011 and noted its lack of transparency 
and safeguards for investments.275 
 There are a number of signs the economy is slowly making progress, however. As 
reported by The Daily News Egypt, gross domestic product growth reached 9.6 percent in 
2011 after averaging 3.6 percent between 2004 and 2010. The International Monetary 
Fund estimates that GDP growth will surpass 10 percent through 2016. Foreign 
investment in particular has increased, with estimates that new contracts reached $55.7 
billion in 2011 and involved 276 companies from 45 countries. Half of the new contracts 
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in 2011 were in oil, gas, or residential real estate, with the rest in electricity, water, and 
sanitation, “showing how the primitive state of Iraq’s infrastructure is a business 
opportunity as well as an obstacle for investors.”276 Still, it will likely take years for most 
Iraqis to benefit from the state’s recent economic growth. The hope of future economic 
prosperity or overall efficacy is not sufficient to legitimize Iraq’s democracy. 
 It is possible the processes of democracy may themselves build legitimacy for the 
system. Alfred C. Stepan argues that a government can retain legitimacy simply by 
claiming that its authority is based on “democratic procedural origins” rather than success 
in the economic or other realms.277 This contention is based on democracy’s status as a 
system in which citizens can vote out representatives with whom they are dissatisfied and 
so remain hopeful for the prospects of new leadership and policies. Furthermore, citizens 
will consider democracy more legitimate over time if they perceive it to respect their 
rights and give them reasonable expectations for the future. Stepan writes: 
As long as a democratic regime completely respects the rule of law, this respect 
can act as an independent insulating factor for the regime and one to which 
citizens can attach an independent value.278  
 
It is unlikely a new democracy will be completely successful in this regard, but if citizens 
believe the system is making progress then it is possible it will retain support. 
 The most recent Iraqi elections took place on March 7, 2010 and filled the 325 
seat Council of Representatives. Most noteworthy was the dispute between the State of 
Law coalition and Iraqiyya over the rightful prime minister following the announcement 
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of election results, delaying the formation of a government for nearly nine months. While 
Iraqiyya, a self-described secular party supported by many Sunni, received more votes 
than State of Law, a coalition of mostly-Shia parties headed by then prime minister Nuri 
al-Maliki, the judiciary was pressured by Maliki to reassess the election rules established 
in the constitution. The judiciary subsequently ruled in Maliki’s favor and allowed State 
of Law the opportunity to align with another Shia bloc post-elections to gain sufficient 
seats and form the government.279 This controversial move prompted protest by former 
interim prime minister Iyad Allawi and other politicians, followed by a nine-month 
stalemate during which State of Law and Iraqiyya leaders debated how the government 
was to be formed and who was the rightful prime minister. 
 A power sharing arrangement known as the Arbil Agreement was formalized in 
November 2010. The settlement called for the participation of all blocs in the formation 
of a “national partnership government.”280 Major issues related to the formal inclusion of 
Iraqiyya and minority parties remained unresolved, however, and according to Marina 
Ottoway and Danial Anas Kaysi, the government “was from the outset based on a fragile 
grand alliance of parties brought together not by a common ideology or a common 
governing program, but by expediency.”281 Neither State of Law nor Iraqiyya were able 
to gain the needed seats along without including the other, and ISCI and the Sadrists, 
though not particularly supportive of Maliki, failed to find an alternative candidate to 
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support. Still, parties of different interests with supporters from various factions came to 
an acceptable arrangement on a highly contentious issue by democratic means and 
without resort to violence.  
 It can also be argued that the elections displayed increased support for issue-based 
candidates and parties over those organized along strict ethnosectarian lines. State of 
Law, though mostly Shia, separated itself from the more radical and sectarian Islamic 
Daawa movement by including secularists and Sunnis in its coalition. This decision was 
largely motivated by the poor January 2009 electoral showing of the party, known then as 
the Iraqi National Alliance, in the non-Shia areas of northern Iraq. Furthermore, State of 
Law displayed ideological coherence rather than identity coherence, and “focused on the 
vision of a functioning centralized government in Iraq.”282   
 Other coalitions organized along less sectarian lines also emerged during the lead 
up to elections. The Unity of Iraq Alliance, for example:  
…forms yet another second-generation alliance in Iraq’s post-2003 politics, based 
on participation by politicians from various sects and ethnicities on an equal basis 
and connected through certain common ideological preferences.283 
  
Additionally, the Iraqiyya coalition led by pro-American and former prime minister 
Allawi, a Sunni, “aspires to be the number one secular political movement in Iraq.”284 
Parties that appealed to sectarian politics, such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Iraqi National 
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Alliance, did not perform as well as those organized along broader, more pragmatic 
issues.285  
 Despite the formation of a government, some aspects of the agreement have not 
been realized and most of the blame has been laid on Maliki and his unwillingness to 
cede power to other state institutions. For example, the agreement stipulated the creation 
of the National Council for Higher Policies to be headed by Allawi. No such body has 
been created, frustrating members of Iraqiyya and other parties that were to be 
included.286 Maliki has also faced criticisms over his increased control of the security 
forces and judicial system. While the government was formed without resort to violence 
or extraconstitutional measures, the inclusion of parties with such varying interests and 
motives has also made significant progress difficult. 
 There is evidence that even with these failures in governance the democratic 
system now experiences a measure of legitimacy and stability. According to the Iraq 
Country Report published by Berteslmann Stiftung in 2010, among Iraqis “there is a 
widespread belief that the current political and constitutional order, at least in its broadest 
contours, is here to stay.”287 Seven nationally representative surveys conducted from 
2004 to 2011 by the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Services, 
an Iraqi organization, seem to confirm this sentiment. Their findings “reveal a significant 
increase in the proportion of Iraqis who adhere to Iraqi nationalism and favor secular 
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politics over an Islamic government.”288 For example, Iraqis who identify themselves as 
“Iraqis above all” rather than Muslims, Arabs, or Kurds, increased to 63 percent in 2008 
from 23 percent in 2004. Though this level dropped slightly to 57 percent in 2011, the 
trend is hopeful.289 
 This information underlines the argument that engaging in the processes of 
democracy helps to legitimize it and make it more stable. As Dankwart A. Rustow writes:  
There must be a conscious adoption of democratic rules, but they must not be so 
much believed in as applied, first perhaps from necessity and gradually from 
habit. The very operation of these rules will enlarge the area of consensus step-by-
step as democracy moves down its crowded agenda.290 
  
It is true that despite their general dislike of Saddam, many Iraqis have questioned 
democracy in both its imposition and its contribution to conflict. Even so, the processes 
of democracy, whether elections, the passage of legislation, or application of the rule of 
law, may gradually be expected as the methods to make decisions and resolve disputes. 
Democracy will become more stable because individuals realize their futures are best 
guaranteed through involvement in its established, peaceful institutions. 
 Participation in democracy might also assist in the formation of a civic, national 
identity that supersedes the more divisive and potentially conflictual identities of 
ethnicity or sect. Lucian W. Pye notes this possibility, writing:  
In stable systems the basic political socialization process that gives people a sense 
of identity also provides a recognition of the legitimate scope of all forms of 
acceptable authority in the system. Conversely, a people may, through coming to 
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accept the legitimacy of popular structures and authorities, develop a sense of 
their national identity.291  
 
Working through established political channels on issues of national concern will bond 
individuals across communities and ethnic and sectarian groups in a way not possible in 
an authoritarian system. As citizens become more involved in the political process, it is 
possible they will increasingly see themselves as Iraqis whose futures are tied to those of 
their fellow citizens. 
Iraq’s most worrying political dispute at the present is what many see as an 
attempt by Maliki to consolidate his power by eliminating political threats. This was 
evident in December 2011 when Maliki, a Shia, alleged Sunni vice president Tariq al-
Hashemi was involved in terrorism and issued a warrant for his arrest. Maliki’s actions in 
this case and others have been met with criticism from across the political spectrum, 
including Kurdish parties and fellow Shia Sadr and his followers.292 While many in 
Iraqiyya’s bloc called for a boycott in response to Hashemi’s arrest, several members 
defected and most have now returned to the parliament.293 Maliki’s critics are right to be 
angered at what appears to be the prime minister’s disregard for the democratic system, 
yet they have chosen to continue participating and to voice their disapproval largely 
through political channels.  
 The practice and eventual habituation of democracy also helps lessen the 
uncertainty that led to conflict during the transition. Zachary Elkins and John Sides note, 
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“As democracies persist over time, individual political and civil liberties, as well as 
electoral actors and procedures, become institutionalized.”294 It is through this learning 
process that citizens come to appreciate a political system that both protects their rights 
and allows them the prospect of gaining power in the future. They continue: “Democracy 
will engender more certainty regarding participatory channels, if not outcomes.”295 
Though democracy always implies at least a measure of uncertainty in terms of electoral 
results and the decisions of representatives, the rules of the game or the standards under 
which actors operate should be unambiguous. This will increase their acceptability 
among citizens. 
 The 2010 elections witnessed a participation rate of nearly 62 percent of the 
population, including many Sunnis. After boycotting contests in the past, Sunnis came to 
the realization that their involvement was necessary to gain political power and a voice in 
important upcoming decisions, including the production and distribution of oil. 
According to a March 2010 report by the U.S. Department of Defense, the involvement 
of political parties across sectarian lines was a “positive indicator of the legitimacy and 
inclusion of the elections.”296 This reaction was reinforced by a report that nearly two 
thirds of Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds viewed the elections as free and fair and expressed a 
belief that the parliament offered hope for the progress of all Iraqis.297 
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 The participation of Sunnis more generally bodes well for the stability of 
democracy in Iraq, as they were the group that naturally felt most threatened by the 
implementation of representative processes. This speaks to their acceptance of the rules 
of the game, as explained by J. Samuel Valenzuela: “…procedural consensus are more 
readily reached if the participants in the democratic process do not expect to lose all the 
time, and think that no dire consequences will follow when they do lose.”298 Sunnis will 
continue to vote and field candidates on the condition that they consider the political 
system fair and inclusive. If, however, the political system and its outcomes become 
unacceptably favorable to the Shia majority or Kurdish federalists, they may perceive 
their interests as no longer served by democracy. 
 Most recently there has been controversy over the arrest of Faraj al-Haidari, head 
of the Independent High Electoral Commission, on corruption charges. Haidari had 
clashed with Maliki after the 2010 election and notably refused to hear Maliki’s petition 
that the commission throw out thousands of Iraqiyya votes. In response to the arrest, 
“Iraqi leaders from across the political spectrum accused…Maliki…of seeking to 
undermine the country’s electoral system.”299 Sadr issued a written statement where he 
declared that Maliki’s order for the arrest “…should be done under the law, not under 
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dictatorship.”300 Ramzi Mardini, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War in the 
United States, remarked that “the arrests are galvanizing Maliki’s opponents because of 
the commission’s central importance to the democratic process.”301 Whether out of a 
realization that Maliki’s increased control will reduce the electoral prospects of their own 
parties, or a concern for the integrity of democracy more generally, Iraqi politicians from 
all segments have voiced their dissent at events they perceive as damaging to the political 
system. 
 Democracy can also reduce the conflict that many see as inevitable in democratic 
transitions in divided states. At the conclusion of Stephen M. Saideman and his partners’ 
study, they remark: “Although competition can exacerbate ethnic conflict, our assessment 
is that increased access will ameliorate it.”302 They confine their argument to the short 
term, because they believe that over time frustrations with democracy will lead to more 
conflict. Other theorists disagree, and contend the longer democracy subsists, the more 
fully it will be accepted by the population as the legitimate framework within which to 
operate. Guillermo O’Donnell, for example, writes, “The existence of a majority (or at 
least a strong and conscious minority) of democrats…is a consequence of the existence – 
over a sufficiently long period of widespread practice – of political democracy.”303 In 
Iraq, it is possible that democracy will succeed if only because Iraq’s major groups have 
come to accept it as the established political system. 
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 Conflict within democracy is resolved through legislative and judicial procedures 
rather than violence. As Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk write:  
…democratization provides a set of rules under which conflict can continue to be 
waged through formal, rule-oriented institutions such as electoral and 
parliamentary processes that offer a fundamental floor of human rights in the 
event one party or another finds itself on the losing side of collective decision-
making processes.304  
 
Pye continues: “…well-established and firmly institutionalized structures and processes 
of government can greatly reduce and even completely overcome the strains that might 
arise from situations of potential crisis in the other areas of nation building.”305 Conflict 
is likely both in states divided along identity lines and in states attempting to deal with 
deep economic and security challenges. However, rule-based resolution of conflict in 
which individual civic and political rights are protected is much preferable to violence. 
 When violence does take place in a democracy, it matters more how the 
government handles it than that it actually occurred. This is particularly true when the 
violence is on behalf of groups or factions that oppose democracy and seek to discredit it 
as a system. Stepan draws parallels between the way a democracy deals with violence 
and its dealings with economic problems:  
…guerilla violence, like economic recession, creates problems for a new 
democratic regime. However, we believe that as with economic recession, the 
most important variable is the way the political system processes the facts of 
guerilla and political violence.306  
 
Democracies have the capacity to manage violence according to consensually established 
rules, ensuring that perpetrators are dealt with fairly and lawfully. This further engenders 
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the political system to the public, as it is just and effective in its treatment of those most 
critical of it. 
 Though still a persistent problem, violence has lessened in Iraq since its peak in 
2006. In 2011, 1,000 fewer people were killed than in 2009 or 2010.307 March 2012 
marked the fewest monthly killings since the U.S. invasion in 2003. The most significant 
attack during this period occurred on March 20, when a series of coordinated explosions 
rocked Iraqi cities in an attempt to disrupt the upcoming Arab League meeting in 
Baghdad.308 The withdrawal of American troops in December 2011 has been met with 
new violence as criminal elements seek to capitalize on the gaps in security. It is too early 
to say whether this uptick in attacks will have a detrimental effect on the political 
process. It will likely depend, however, on how the government’s security forces and 
judicial processes handle the perpetrators of such violence and if the use of violence as an 
expression of grievance is increasingly unacceptable to Iraqi citizens. 
 The debate over the U.S. withdrawal itself confirmed Iraq’s democratic system. 
Though the U.S. military’s departure was in line with the 2008 Status of Forces 
Agreement signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, there was speculation 
that the Iraqis would request some troops stay to provide security and training. The U.S. 
was not able to secure legal immunity for any remaining troops, a condition that was 
nonnegotiable for American military leaders. More importantly, the Iraqi parliament 
would have had to approve any new agreement, an unlikely prospect given the 
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unpopularity of the continued U.S. presence among many citizens. By requiring that the 
elected legislature approve this type of decision, Iraqi leaders and their American 
counterparts acknowledged democracy as the framework within which to address the 
issue. They also recognized that Iraqi politicians would likely defer to their constituents’ 
opinions and vote down any agreement that kept U.S. troops in the country. 
 The Arab League summit in March 2012 marked a significant achievement for the 
state of Iraq in terms of security and regional recognition. The summit had not been held 
in Iraq since 1990, and was rescheduled in 2011 due to instability. According to Foreign 
Minister Moshyar Zebari, the summit was “…a recognition of the new Iraq that emerged 
since 2003 by its new leaders, its new constitution, its new politics, [and] its new political 
system at the heart of the Middle East.” 309 The event did suffer a number of controversies 
owing largely to the $500 million price tag associated with planning measures and the 
somewhat poor attendance by regional Sunni leaders; still, its relative success does reflect 
on the progress that Iraq has made in security and governance.  
 Finally, various Iraq leaders including President Jalal Talabani, Sadr, Kurdistan 
President Massoud Barzani, and Allawi, met in Arbil on April 28, 2012, to discuss the 
future of Iraqi democracy. As reported by Associated Free Press, the politicians called 
“to put in place mechanisms that can solve the instability, and for ways to enhance the 
democratic process and activate the democratic mechanisms in managing the country’s 
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affairs and preventing dangers that are targeting democracy.”310 Sadr, in particular, 
stressed the need for adherence to the constitution and the Arbil Agreement, noting, 
“minorities are an important point of Iraq, and we have to bring them to participate in 
building Iraq, politically, economically, and in security.”311 The leaders also stressed that 
Iraqis’ economic needs must take precedence over sectarian and ethnic divisions.  
 Iraq’s current difficulties involve those related to the day-to-day political 
wrangling of elites as they attempt to maintain their grasp on power. This is a fact of life 
in many democracies, including those much more established than Iraq. Iraq’s situation is 
then made more difficult by the reality that these political contests are taking place in a 
new and imperfect political system, one where political instability has in the past been 
associated with violence and security failures. After nearly ten years and five elections, 
however, there is evidence of increased cooperation across sectarian lines. The decision 
of Iraq’s political elites to act pragmatically rather than in strict adherence to identity 
divisions is likely a reflection of their calculations on how best to gain power in a system 
characterized by popular support.  
 Still, Iraq’s current and future challenges cannot be underestimated. Though 
violence is a persistent threat to social and political stability, perhaps most troubling 
currently are Maliki’s actions as he seeks to consolidate power, seemingly at the expense 
of Iraq’s new democratic institutions. There is the potential that his political opponents 
and those they represent will view democracy under Maliki as no longer amenable to 
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their interests and prospects for power. However, if Maliki is forced by his own party or 
others inside the government to stay within the law, and if his opponents adhere to the 
democratic system in their challenges to him, democracy and its role as mediator of 
competing interests within Iraqi society will be strengthened. The processes of 
democracy may not be wholeheartedly embraced by Iraqis, but they increasingly 
characterize the framework within which actors from all sects and ethnicities have agreed 
to work.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
Democracy in Iraq faces a number of difficulties related largely to the manner in 
which it was introduced and its experience with authoritarianism and an exclusive 
political system that made ethnic and sectarian identities conflictual and competitive. 
This analysis of Iraq’s democratic transition has sought to argue that its experience so far 
is neither surprising nor hopeless. Furthermore, a review of some of the major theorists of 
democratization shows that political processes may over time strengthen the system’s 
legitimacy as individuals from all communities participate in and come to have 
confidence in the democratic system as provider of equal representation and procedural 
fairness. 
 States divided along ethnic or religious lines often experience conflict during the 
democratization process, and Iraq is in many ways such a case. Conflict does not occur 
because identities are primordial and identity groups are inevitably in opposition; rather, 
democracy triggers conflict as it allows for competition among new political actors in a 
context of uncertain power and security. Elites play an important role during the 
transition, and their decision to focus on issues of ethnic or religious identity as opposed 
to pragmatic, national concerns can increase the likelihood of conflict. It is frequently the 
case that elections both highlight and antagonize identity groups and serve to destabilize 
the new political system. Democratic consolidation and the formation of an inclusive, 
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civic identity is threatened if political and ethnosectarion loyalties become inseparable 
and cooperation among groups is seen as unlikely and undesirable. 
 Though democratization often intensifies divisions along identity lines, continued 
participation in democratic processes has the potential to make identities less narrow and 
more focused on national issues. The argument that Iraq is an artificial state as evidenced 
by sectarian conflict is not fully explanatory of either its history or its democratic 
experience. Accordingly, as Alfred C. Stepan and Juan J. Linz argue, “Political identities 
are less primordial and fixed than contingent and changing. They are amenable to being 
constructed or eroded by political institutions and political choices.”312 It is true that 
under Saddam Iraq was constructed largely as a religiously, tribally, and ethnically 
divided state. This does not preempt the state from developing into an inclusive and 
democratic political entity even given its initial obstacles.  
 Iraq’s history shows instances of both discord and cooperation among the Shia, 
Sunni, and Kurds. For the most part, successive leaders and an unrepresentative political 
system led many Iraqis to view themselves in sectarian terms as they competed for power 
and economic goods. Eric Davis notes, for example:  
The 1920 Revolution set a precedent for subordinating ethnic and confessional 
loyalties to a larger national entity. However, neither Great Britain nor the 
fledgling Iraqi state in formed in the wake of the revolt encouraged this spirit of 
cooperation.313  
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This lends support to the argument that relations among Iraq’s identity groups are largely 
contextual, and might have been improved if state leaders had encouraged identification 
with the state and improved the political and economic interests of all people.  
 Relations among Iraq’s communities worsened under Saddam, particularly 
following the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars and sanctions. The state was increasingly 
weakened, economically and socially, and thus unable and perhaps unwilling to provide 
for all Iraqis irrespective of identity. In particular, relations worsened between the central 
state and Shia, Kurds, and those Sunni not favored by Saddam. According to Martin 
Bunton, “Whereas the material prosperity and relative stability of the 1970s attracted 
Shia [and Kurdish] support, especially in the cities, the material rewards became scarcer 
in the 1980s and 1990s.”314 It was increasingly difficult for the state to substitute material 
rewards with meaningful political reforms, further excluding those groups outside of 
Saddam’s narrow tribal bases.   
 The United States made a number of mistakes in its invasion and introduction of 
democracy that worsened state capacity and ethnosectarian divisions. Perhaps the most 
severe of these involved the inability of the U.S. to provide sufficient security after 
Saddam’s fall and during the uncertainty brought on by the transition. Adeed Dawisha 
writes of the period following the invasion:  
In such uncertain circumstances, the exhibition of uncontested state capacity was 
thus unquestionably crucial. That, however, did not come to pass; indeed, it would 
not be an exaggeration to say that the most defining characteristic of the state that 
emerged after 2003 was a chronic weakness that was palpable to all.315  
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New political competitors and those who opposed democracy in general sought to take 
advantage of this weakness, either to gain power or to discredit the United States and its 
allies. Increased instability led many Iraqis to look to their religious or tribal communities 
for support and security. 
 Conflict largely on such ethnosectarian lines has led many observers to argue that 
democracy cannot be achieved in Iraq. In this view, identity divisions are too deep and 
the state too fragile for democracy to successfully engage Iraq’s communities on civic, 
largely non-violent terms. Still, there is some evidence that Iraqi democracy is 
experiencing a level of success even now. Despite its imperfections, the major political 
actors have displayed an adherence to the procedural rules of the game. These rules are 
far from ideal, yet they provide a certain level of needed certainty in terms of political 
participation and electoral competition. Gradually, increased involvement according to 
democratic processes may improve and build support for the system. Additionally, 
cooperation across identities will lead Iraqis to engage with each other as fellow citizens 
regardless of religious sect or ethnicity. 
 As with many divided states undergoing democratization, Iraq’s first elections 
were decided largely along sectarian lines. This was less the case in 2010, as political 
parties based on more pragmatic considerations made an appearance and performed well 
in the parliamentary contests. The motivation for doing so was likely political actors’ 
desire to compete for more votes and to show progress on issues requiring cooperation. 
As Stepan and Linz note, “…elections can create agendas, can create actors, can 
reconstruct identities, help legitimate and delegitimate claims to obedience, and create 
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power.”316 Continued experience with electoral competition and the rewards it provides 
for gaining cross-sectarian support can further break down the link originally formed 
between political and ethnosectarian identities.  
 It is especially important that in the coming years key issues related to Iraq’s 
economic and political development are resolved within the democratic system, to further 
legitimize it as the means by which decisions that affect all citizens are made. Dankwart 
A. Rustow explains:  
…both politicians and citizens learn from the successful resolution of some issues 
to place their faith in the new rules and to apply them to new issues. Their trust 
will grow more quickly if, in the early decades of the new regime, a wide variety 
of political tendencies can participate in the conduct of affairs, either by joining 
various coalitions or by taking turns as government and opposition.317 
  
It can be argued that the political participation and success of each of Iraq’s communities 
has already helped to strengthen legitimacy among such communities’ leaders and 
members. Though some sense of efficacy is important, it is more the process of engaging 
in representative institutions than the actual accomplishments that will validate 
democratic procedures.  
 In terms of domestic stability, violence posed by either outsiders taking advantage 
of the state’s weaknesses or Iraqis seeking to display dissatisfaction with the regime 
remains a problem. Even so, democracy is not necessarily defeated by such events. As 
Stepan explains:  
Certainly there will always be small minorities who, knowing that they cannot 
rally a large number of voters to their support, will turn to violence via terrorism 
[…]. The important point, however, is that these attempts are not likely to be 
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successful in a democracy unless there is a much broader base of support for those 
engaging in the use of violence.318 
  
If violence as a political tool and a symbol of discontent is no longer seen as legitimate, 
those who employ it in Iraq will be weakened in their positions. Conversely, those who 
campaign and gain power within lawful democratic channels will help strengthen the 
system. 
 As with all democracies, Iraqis will naturally become frustrated when elected 
officials do not measure up to their expectations or achieve what was promised. Still, a 
“critical advantage of democracy is that it is possible to distinguish the democratic 
regime itself from the government of the day.”319 Citizens can remain hopeful for the 
future and exercise accountability over politicians through continued participation in 
elections. For Iraqi politicians, this requires compromise and a moderation of their 
positions to achieve goals and remain in office. Sunnis must realize they will no longer 
hold the absolute power they did under Saddam. Based on recent events, Maliki and the 
Shia more generally must come to display a willingness to work within democratic rules 
and to uphold the system though this might mean a loss to their majoritarian status. 
Finally, Kurds must acknowledge their place in the Iraqi state by balancing their demands 
for self-rule with meaningful participation in the central government.  
 Democracy in Iraq then confirms the predictions of many theorists of 
democratization in divided states. Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divisions have challenge its 
transition to democracy, yet democracy remains the best system for managing conflict 
along such divisions through institutions that provide equal representation and the 
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protection of civil and political rights. This analysis has attempted to show that in spite of 
its challenges, Iraqi democracy has gained a measure of legitimacy among the state’s 
communities and conflict once resolved violently is increasingly played out through 
political channels and along non-ethnic or sectarian lines. Increased stability and progress 
on pressing economic and social problems will undoubtedly make democracy in Iraq 
more secure; however, continued participation in its processes is most important in 
reducing divisions and creating support for a system that represents all Iraqis equally. 
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